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I. Introduction and Executive Summary 
 
“The grand plan was to make government pay compensation as for a taking of property 
every time its regulations impinged too severely on a property right—limiting the possible uses for 
a parcel of land or restricting or tying up a business in regulatory red tape.  If the government 
labored under so severe an obligation, there would be, to say the least, much less regulation.” 
Charles Fried, ORDER AND LAW, ARGUING THE REAGAN 
REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 183 (1991). 
“It is one of the happy accidents of our federal system that a single courageous state may, if 
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.” 
Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
 
This report examines the experiences of two states, Florida and Oregon, with so-called 
takings “compensation” measures.  The goal of the report is to identify the lessons from these 
states that might be useful to citizens and policy makers in other jurisdictions considering similar 
measures. 
 For the last twenty years there has been a nationwide debate about whether government 
should be required to pay property owners to comply with land use and environmental rules, above 
and beyond the protection for property owners provided by the U.S. and state constitutions.  
Property rights advocates have argued that requiring the public to pay to enforce regulatory 
requirements would improve the fairness of regulatory programs and force government officials to 
make more judicious and discriminating decisions about the regulations they adopt and enforce.1
Opponents have argued that such a compensation mandate would undermine the public’s ability to 
implement community protections and impose unfair financial burdens on taxpayers.2
At least so far, the U.S. Congress has rejected takings compensation proposals.3 The 
majority of states have rejected these proposals as well, although many states have adopted more 
limited forms of private property rights legislation.4 However, half a dozen states have adopted 
 
1 E.g., E. Donald Elliott, How Takings Legislation Could Improve Environmental Regulation, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1177, 1178 (1997). 
2 E.g., Glenn Sugameli, Takings Bills Threaten Private Property, People, And The Environment, 8
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 521, 567-80 (1997). 
3 See Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute, Regulatory Takings Legislation, at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current_research/regulatory 
_takings/takings_legis.cfm (collecting failed property rights proposals in Congress). 
4 See Harvey M. Jacobs, STATE PROPERTY RIGHTS LAWS; THE IMPACTS OF THOSE LAWS ON MY
LAND (Lincoln Institute 1999); John D. Echeverria, REFLECTIONS ON MEASURE 7, 1000 FRIENDS OF 




legislation that explicitly requires the government to pay property owners subject to regulatory 
restrictions when the restrictions do not amount to “takings” under the federal or state 
constitutions.  
 This report focuses on Florida and Oregon because these states have adopted the broadest 
and, at least from the perspective of property rights advocates, the most successful measures.  In 
1995, Florida adopted legislation that includes two separate but related measures, the Bert J. Harris 
Private Property Rights Act and the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act.  
In 2004, Oregon voters adopted Measure 37, and three years later adopted Measure 49, which 
partly reversed Measure 37.  The report also discusses, in more summary fashion, the 
consequences of takings compensation legislation in the several other states that have embraced this 
legislative agenda, including Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.   
These state measures provide an opportunity to examine the consequences of adopting the 
property rights agenda.  The states are serving as laboratories, to use Justice Brandeis’s apt phrase, 
producing potentially valuable information for other jurisdictions grappling with the takings issue.  
In particular, Californians will have an opportunity to vote on two competing property rights 
proposals in June 2008, one of which, Proposition 98, arguably would require the government to 
pay to enforce land use and environmental laws.5 Other states or the U.S. Congress may also 
debate the takings issue in the future. 
 While the experiences with the takings agenda in Florida and Oregon (as well as the other 
states) vary in important respects, our analysis leads to five overarching conclusions: 
The Takings Agenda Undermines Community Protections. The virtually invariable effect of 
takings legislation, to the extent it has been effective, has been to force state and local governments 
to not adopt laws and regulations they otherwise would have adopted and to not enforce restrictions 
already on the books.  Despite their label as “compensation” measures, this legislation has only 
very rarely resulted in actual payments to property owners.  Nor has takings legislation resulted in 
more discriminating or judicious use of regulatory authority.  Instead, these measures have 
essentially blocked the enactment of any significant new community protections and severely 
undermined the protections that pre-dated the measures. 
Special Interests Benefit the Most from the Takings Agenda. While the property rights 
agenda is generally advertised as being for and on behalf of the “little guy,” the primary 
beneficiaries of the property rights agenda have been relatively well to do special interests.  In 
Oregon, the primary beneficiaries of Measure 37 have been timber companies seeking the 
 
5 California Center for Environmental Law & Policy, CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 98 & 99: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Berkeley May 2008), available at  
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/envirolaw/Prop_98-99_Analysis-1.pdf; Shute, Mihaly & 
Weinberger Letter to Susan Smartt, California League of Conservation Voters Education Fund 
(Dec. 6, 2007), available at www.ecovote.org/no98yes99/smw-letter-re-jarvis.pdf. 
2
3opportunity to subdivide and sell off their resource lands and/or wishing to avoid new restrictions 
on timber harvesting practices.  In Florida, the primary beneficiaries of property rights legislation 
have been real estate developers and corporate land owners.  Developers and owners of vacant, 
developable land have benefited at the expense of the rest of society, including homeowners whose 
community protections have been undermined. 
The Takings Agenda Generates Land Use Conflicts. The property rights agenda has 
fostered additional land use controversy, generating litigation and other legal claims and creating 
conflicts between neighboring land owners.  The conflicts generated by the Florida property rights 
legislation have been particularly intense in urban areas and in the urbanizing fringe, while the 
Oregon property rights legislation has primarily produced land use conflicts in rural agricultural 
and forest lands. 
The Takings Agenda Confers Special Windfalls. Takings measures have conferred 
windfalls—either in the form of actual payments or, far more frequently, legal exemptions from 
regulations—by permitting certain land owners to evade the responsibilities that apply to the rest of 
the community.  Economics research demonstrates that comprehensive land use regulatory 
programs have little if any net adverse effect on property values.  Thus, takings “compensation” 
awards, far from providing a remedy for significant regulatory burdens, generally provide claimants 
windfalls based on the inflated value of special exemptions from the rules and regulations that apply 
to everybody else. 
The Takings Agenda Undermines Local Democracy. Finally, the property rights agenda 
has undermined democratic government, especially at the local level.  The property rights measures 
have very seriously impaired communities’ capacity to enact new land use laws and limited the 
opportunities for members of the public to advocate for and defend their communities. 
This report is organized as follows.  The next section describes in detail Florida’s 1995 
property rights legislation, discusses how the legislation altered the balance of power in the state 
between developers and other large land owners and the general public, and addresses Florida’s 
Hometown Democracy movement, the grassroots response to the success of the property rights 
movement in Florida.  The following section describes in detail Oregon’s Measure 37, the torrent 
of legal claims against the state and local governments produced by this measure, and the 
consequences for Oregon’s comprehensive land use program.  It concludes with a discussion of 
recently adopted Oregon Measure 49 and its significance.  The final section discusses in some 
detail the five major lessons, set forth above, that we have drawn from this study. 
II. Florida Property Rights Legislation 
Introduction
On May 18, 1995, the State of Florida adopted what is arguably the most far-reaching 
property rights legislation in the country.6 The legislation has two separate, but closely related 
parts.  The Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act created a judicially enforceable 
right to financial compensation based on “burdensome” regulatory restrictions on the use of real 
property. 7 The Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act created a mediation 
process designed to permit land owners to obtain relief from allegedly “unfair” or 
“unreasonable” restrictions. 8 
Florida adopted takings legislation against the backdrop of the state’s comprehensive land 
use regulatory program.  Adopted in the 1970s and 80s in response to public concerns about the 
social and environmental impacts of rapid development,9 Florida’s primary land use laws include 
the Florida State Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972,10 the Florida Environmental Land and 
Water Management Act of 1973,11 and the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land 
Development and Regulation Act of 1985.12 Together, these statutes require the state to adopt and 
maintain a State Comprehensive Plan establishing goals and policies to guide Florida’s growth, 
require local governments to adopt comprehensive plans and implementing regulations, and provide 
for state and regional oversight of growth management policies across the state.13 Subsequent 
enactments strengthened Florida’s land use system by directing development away from barrier 
islands and other high-hazard coastal areas, creating incentives to promote more compact urban 
development patterns, and requiring concurrency between new development authorized by local 
governments and local infrastructure capacity.14 While the Florida property rights legislation did 
not formally amend this legislation, it has drastically altered its effectiveness. 
 One hallmark of the Florida land use program has been extensive opportunities for public 
involvement.  The Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation 
Act declares that “It is the intent of the Legislature that the public participate in the comprehensive 
planning process to the fullest extent possible.”15 Members of the public have broad rights to 
 
6 1995 FLA. LAWS CH. 95-181 (C.S.H.B. 863) (codified at FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001 and § 70.51).  
Oregon Measure 37 was even more far reaching before it was amended by Measure 49. 
7 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001. 
8 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51. 
9 David J. Russ, How the “Property Rights” Movement Threatens Property Values in Florida, 9
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 410-12 (1994). 
10 FLA. ST. ANN. §§ 186.001-186.031, 186.801-186.901. 
11 FLA. ST. ANN. § 380.012, et seq. 
12 FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3161, et seq. 
13 FLA. ST. ANN. §§ 163.3167(2), 163.3194, 163.3202. 
14 FLA. ST. ANN. §§ 163.3178, 163.3180, 163.2511-163.2526. 
15 FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3181(1). 
5initiate and intervene in local proceedings involving comprehensive plans,16 as well as more limited 
standing to challenge approvals of particular development projects in court.17 Again, the property 
rights legislation significantly changed the role of the public in the land use process. 
 The Florida takings legislation was adopted at the height of the private property rights 
movement, both nationally and in Florida.18 The debate over takings in Florida consumed several 
years and featured a gubernatorial study commission on the topic, a proposed state constitutional 
amendment, and numerous competing legislative proposals.19 Major corporate property owners 
were the driving force behind the push for legislation, although they succeeded in enlisting 
numerous ideological allies and building a populist base of support.20 By 1995, following a shift in 
control of the legislature to the Republican Party, a political consensus emerged that some type of 
property rights legislation was inevitable.  The final legislation emerged from a bi-partisan 
negotiation process organized by Governor Lawton Chiles, a Democrat.21 
The basic objective of the Bert Harris Act is clear: to expand upon the protections provided 
to property owners by the Takings Clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions.  The 
Bert Harris Act begins by stating 
The Legislature recognizes that some laws, regulations, and ordinances of the state and 
political entities in the state, as applied, may inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private 
 
16 FLA. ST. ANN. §§ 163.3184(9)-(10) (authorizing formal initiation of or intervention in 
administrative hearings on comprehensive plan amendments); FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3181 (same).  
See also FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3215(4) (stating that local administrative proceedings “must provide 
an opportunity for participation in the process by an aggrieved or adversely affected party, allowing 
a reasonable time for the party to prepare and present a case for the quasi-judicial hearing”). 
17 FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3215(3) (“Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain a de 
novo action for declaratory, injunctive, or other relief against any local government to challenge any 
decision of such local government granting or denying an application for, or to prevent such local 
government from taking any action on, a development order, as defined in s. 163.3164, which 
materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property which is not 
consistent with the comprehensive plan adopted under this part. ”); FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3215(4) 
(providing that parties may challenge decisions by “an appeal filed by a petition for writ of 
certiorari filed in circuit court”).  See also Board of County Com’rs of Brevard County v. Snyder,
627 So.2d 469, 474-76 (Fla. 1993) (establishing that some land use decisions are “quasi-judicial” 
and thus “subject to review by certiorari” and “will be upheld only if they are supported by 
substantial competent evidence”).  
18 See Robert Meltz, Federal Regulation of the Environment and the Taking Issue, 37 FED. B. 
NEWS & J. 95 (Feb. 1990). 
19 Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Florida’s Property Rights Act: A Political Quick Fix Results in Mixed 
Bag of Tricks, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 327-333 (1995). 
20 Id. at 329 n. 65 (observing that St. Joe Paper Company, U.S. Sugar Corporation, Lykes 
Brothers, Collier Enterprises, and A. Duda & Sons “were among the most powerful corporate 
sponsors of the property rights movement in 1994”). 
21 Id. at 318 (“The Act, although passed on the next to the last day of the session, represented a 
compromise painstakingly crafted over weeks of intense negotiations among an ad hoc group of 
Senators and Representatives who were longtime property rights activists, key executives 
representing land use agencies, lobbyists for developers and small and large agricultural interests, 
environmentalists, and state and local governments.”).  
property rights without amounting to a taking under the State Constitution or the United 
States Constitution.  The Legislature determines that there is an important state interest in 
protecting the interests of private property owners from such inordinate burdens.22 
It is less clear what the Act’s proponents thought the consequences of this new policy 
would be.  Governor Chiles predicted that Florida’s regulatory programs would remain largely 
intact:  “[W]e can be proud of this legislation.  It safeguards our environmental and growth-
management protections while also offering private property owners a means to seek compensation 
for devalued land.”23 Other close observers predicted that the law would not result in “an 
explosion of litigation or a rash of damage awards”  but rather would “produce a sense of caution” 
among government officials.24 
The goal of the Dispute Resolution Act was to reduce the stringency and increase the 
flexibility of regulatory controls by providing land owners an additional opportunity, once the 
normal land use regulatory review process was complete, to seek relief from “unreasonable” or 
“unfair” regulations.  In contrast to the Bert Harris Act, the primary purpose of which was to 
create new substantive protection for private property rights, the Dispute Resolution Act granted 
property owners new procedural rights to object to and obtain relief from regulations. 
The Florida Property Rights Laws
This section provides a sketch and analysis of the primary provisions of the Bert Harris Act 
and the Dispute Resolution Act as a prelude to a more extensive discussion of the consequences of 
the adoption of these measures, especially the Bert Harris Act. 
 The Bert Harris Act. The Bert Harris Act creates a right of action to recover financial 
compensation or other relief when a regulatory decision or other government action “inordinately 
burden[s] an existing use of real property.”25 Importantly, and confusingly, the term “existing 
use” does not have its ordinary meaning, because it encompasses not only actual existing uses but 
also certain future uses.  Specifically, the Act defines a proposed future use to be an existing use for 
the purposes of the Act if five conditions are met: the use (1) is “reasonably foreseeable,” (2) is 
“non-speculative,” (3) is “suitable for the subject real property,” (4) is “compatible with adjacent 
 
22 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(1). 
23 Roy Hunt, Property Rights and Wrongs: Historic Preservation and Florida’s 1995 Private 
Property Rights Protection Act, 48 FLA. L. REV. 709, 715 (1996).  See also Ron Weaver, Bert 
Harris Update (1997) (“Wetlands, woodpeckers, scrubjays, and the like should be protected 
generally, but owners need no longer bear disproportionate shares of the burden of that 
protection.”). 
24 David L. Powell, Robert M. Rhodes, & Dan R. Stengle, A Measured Step to Protect Private 
Property Rights, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 255, 296 (1995). 
25 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(2). 
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7land uses,” and (5) creates “an existing fair market value in the property greater than the fair 
market value of the actual, present use or activity on the real property.” 26 
While this definition appears to be limiting, the Act actually applies quite broadly to 
regulations affecting future land uses.  Many of the conditions listed above are ambiguous and do 
not establish clear restrictions on the kinds of potential future uses covered by the Act.  The 
requirement that a proposed use be “compatible with adjacent land uses” is potentially the most 
significant, because it arguably excludes major development projects in undeveloped rural areas.  
But assuming this is correct, an “existing use” still arguably includes virtually any potentially 
profitable development opportunity in Florida’s urban centers or in the urbanizing fringe. 
 The other key term in the Act—“inordinate burden”—is defined as a government action  
that has directly restricted or limited the use of real property such that [1] the property 
owner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed expectations for the 
existing [i.e., or proposed] use of the real property or [2] the property owner is left with 
existing [i.e., or proposed] uses that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears 
permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which 
in fairness should be borne by the public at large.27 
This provision creates two alternative paths for demonstrating the existence of an inordinate 
burden.  First, the claimant can attempt to show that her development plans are based upon a 
“reasonable, investment-backed expectation” for use of the property and that the regulation bars 
her from “attaining” this expectation.  Second, an owner can attempt to show that the restriction is 
“unreasonable” in the sense that the owner is left with such limited uses of the property that she 
has been forced to bear a burden that “in fairness should be borne by the public at large.”   
The inordinate burden standard is clearly far more expansive than the constitutional takings 
standard,28 and indeed goes beyond any reading of the federal Takings Clause ever offered by any 
justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.  Generally speaking, a regulatory taking occurs only in 
 
26 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(3)(b). 
27 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(3)(e). 
28 Commentators have offered different views on how far the inordinate burden standard diverges 
from constitutional doctrine.  Some contend that it represents only a “cautious and modest” 
expansion of constitutional takings doctrine, which is “not intended to drastically affect Florida’s 
growth management or environmental laws.”  Richard Grosso & Robert Hartsell, Old McDonald 
Still Has a Farm: Agricultural Property Rights After the Veto of S.B. 1712, FLA. BAR. J. (Mar. 
2005).  Others contend that the inordinate takings standard has more bite.  As one commentary 
observed, “You can make the argument that Florida’s legislature wouldn’t have gone to so much 
trouble if all they meant to do was to make it a little easier for land owners to gain compensation.”  
Charles C. Carter & John Taylor, Current Status of Property Rights Compensation States, 33 REAL 
ESTATE L. J. 405, 411 (2005). See also Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Florida’s Private Property 
Rights Protection Act: Does it Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 695, 697-
706 (1996) (offering a highly critical appraisal of the Bert Harris Act).  
Arizona 
 
In November 2006, Arizona voters approved, by a margin of 65% to 35%, Proposition 207, 
or the Private Property Rights Protection Act.a The Act includes a pay or waive provision closely 
modeled after Oregon Measure 37,b and another provision, responding to the Supreme Court 
decision in Kelo v. City of New London,c restricting the use of eminent domain for economic 
development.d The yes campaign spent $1.8 million, most of it contributed by Americans for 
Limited Government, “a group led by New York real estate mogul Howard Rich,”e in comparison 
to the opponents’ relatively paltry budget of $420,000.f
While the drafters of the Arizona proposition used Measure 37 as their starting point, there 
are several important differences.  Most significantly, whereas Measure 37 had broad retroactive 
effect, the Arizona proposition only applies to laws adopted following its enactment.g The drafters 
of the Arizona proposition also tinkered with the Measure 37 exemptions, for example, by 
exempting regulations restricting the use of property for “housing of sex offenders, selling illegal 
drugs, liquor control, or pornography [or] obscenity,” and (somewhat ambiguously) laws that that 
“[d]o not directly regulate an owner’s land.”h In addition, the Arizona proposition avoided some 
of the drafting problems with Measure 37 by making clear that waivers are transferablei and that the 
government entity that enacts a law (as opposed to enforces it) would be liable to pay 
compensation.j
Arizona’s takings proposition already has had dramatic effects, in particular on the State’s 
historic preservation efforts.  The City of Flagstaff is the target of the first lawsuit under the Private 
Property Rights Protection Act, brought by several land owners objecting to the creation of an 
overlay district in the City’s most historic neighborhood.k The plaintiffs demanded $368,000 in 
compensation.l One historic preservation advocate objected to the owners’ proposals to tear down 
small historic buildings and build larger modern structures, stating: “We’re trying to stop this from 
happening anymore. It’s not what we wanted to live around when we bought here.”m
Tuscon may not be far behind.  A developer of “minidorms” near the University of 
Arizona has threatened to sue the city for $12.6 million based on a “regulation passed by the City 
Council . . . [that] requires a historic study be done on any 45-year-old or older building in 
Tucson’s historic core . . . before it can be torn down” and allows the City up to six months 
following the study to determine if “it wants to buy the property or find a private buyer.”n The 
lawyer representing the developer was quoted in the local press as stating that he “hope[d] to 
trigger a flood of Proposition 207 claims from other property owners by printing easy to use fill-in-
 
a AZ. REV. ST. §§ 12-1131-38; Daniel Kraker, Growth Unfettered, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
November 26, 2007; Front, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 2007.  
b AZ. REV. ST. § 12-1134. 
c 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
d AZ. REV. ST. §§ 12-1131, 1133, 1136. 
e Amanda J. Crawford, After Smoke Cleared, A look at Finances, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 
2006. 
f Id. 
g AZ. REV. ST. § 12-1134(B)(7). 
h AZ. REV. ST. § 12-1134(B). 
i AZ. REV. ST. § 12-1134(F). 
j AZ. REV. ST. § 12-1134(A). 
k Kraker, Growth Unfettered.
l Id.; J. Ferguson, Property rights test case filed, ARIZONA DAILY SUN, June 29, 2007. 
m Kraker, Growth Unfettered.
n Rob O’Dell, Minidorm developer threatens $12M suit, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Sept. 15, 2007. 
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9the-blank claim forms.” o Another developer said the City’s total liability could reach $500 million.p
Similarly, in Pinal County, a developer has threatened a half-million dollar lawsuit based on the 
reversion of the zoning on a property to farm use after the owner failed to proceed in timely fashion 
with an authorized development projectq
In addition, the proposition has already had a chilling effect in several communities.  The 
threat of a $40 million dollar lawsuit reportedly led the City of Phoenix to repeal a historic district it 
established in 2007.r Mayor Phil Golden was quoted as saying that the repeal occurred “on the 
advice of attorneys,” and that he had “a fiduciary duty to the citizens not to risk $40 million.”s
One resident concluded: “The ability to establish new historic districts . . . is nearly impossible 
because of Proposition 207.” t In Tempe, citizens withdrew an application for the establishment of 
a historic district after opponents threatened to sue under Proposition 207 and it appeared likely that 
the City would reject the application based on this threat.u In Tucson, the proposition may thwart 
efforts to promote in-fill development through adoption of a “neighborhood preservation zoning 
overlay” plan.v Colette Altaffer, president of the Catalina Vista Neighborhood Association and a 
founder of the Neighborhood Infill Coalition, said that “Proposition 207 has rendered us toothless, 
unfortunately. It locked us into where we were with an existing code. You can’t tighten it without 
facing a challenge, and you’re really reluctant to loosen it. ”w
According to another observer, while “on the surface” Proposition 207 “sounds fair 
enough, . . . it creates a nightmare because it mainly vests real estate entrepreneurs with the ability to 
circumvent the will of the majority of residents in any given neighborhood.”x
o Id. 
p Id. 
q Lynh Bui, Property Rights Suit Threatened, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 2008. 
r Minidorm issue may trigger necessary lawsuits, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Aug. 8, 2007; Laurie 
Roberts, Developer Takes on City Hall and Wins, Thanks to Prop. 207, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Apr. 
14, 2007. 
s Id. 
t Diana Balazs, Prop. 207 Hampers Municipalities, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 2007. 
u Garin Groff, Tempe neighborhood’s historical status on hold: City’s oldest area looks at new 
way to achieve designation, TRIBUNE, Sept. 7, 2007; Handling history: Memories shouldn’t erode 
private-property rights, TRIBUNE, Aug. 22, 2007. 
v Tom Beal, Pilot plans disappoint Midtown neighbors, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Jan. 27, 2008. 
w Id. 
x Minidorm issue may trigger necessary lawsuits, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Aug. 8, 2007. 
“extreme circumstances” 29 when a regulation is so burdensome that it is the “functional 
equivalent” of a physical occupation or an outright condemnation.30 Outside of the narrow per se 
category of “total” takings,31 regulatory takings claims are generally evaluated using an ad hoc 
analysis focusing on the economic impact of the government action, the degree to which it interferes 
with the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government 
action.32 This analysis may encompass various considerations but typically addresses, in addition 
to economic impact, whether the claimant was aware of the regulation when he purchased the 
property or could have reasonably anticipated its adoption, the degree to which the regulation 
singles out an owner for special treatment or is comprehensive in nature, and whether the regulation 
is designed to prevent activities that the legislature has determined are harmful to the public 
welfare.33 
By contrast, under the inordinate burden standard, and focusing on the more expansive part 
of the definition, an owner is entitled to compensation if a regulation permanently bars her from 
“attaining” her “reasonable, investment-backed expectations. ”  Under this test, the economic 
burden imposed by a regulation (if any), the relative comprehensiveness of the regulation, or the 
potential harmfulness of the proposed development, all become irrelevant.  Any developer who has 
purchased property in an urban or urbanizing area with a plan to develop it can make a strong claim 
that the imposition of virtually any new regulatory constraint represents a compensable action.34 
This takings standard plainly hamstrings the ability of state and local governments to respond to 
challenges posed by new scientific information, changed circumstances, or evolving social values. 
While the “investment-backed expectations” language is borrowed from constitutional 
takings doctrine, the Act says that the courts are free to disregard how this language has been 
interpreted in that context.35 Thus, this term could take on a new and different meaning in Florida’s 
 
29 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc., 474 U. S. 121, 126 (1985). 
30 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).  
31 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
32 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-539.  
33 John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 178-
99 (2005). 
34 The second path for establishing an inordinate burden effectively converts the so-called 
Armstrong principle—the U.S. Supreme Court’s often-quoted statement that the Takings Clause is 
“designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”—into a freestanding takings test.  
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  While the Armstrong principle is a central 
element of modern takings doctrine, the Supreme Court has never suggested that it can serve as a 
determinative test for deciding when compensation is due.  It is hard to say how, if at all, this 
takings test would diverge from the traditional constitutional takings test. 
35 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(9) (stating that the Act’s terms “may not necessarily be construed 




statutory takings regime, lending further support to the conclusion that the inordinate burden 
standard diverges significantly from the constitutional takings test. 
The Bert Harris Act, unlike Oregon’s Measure 37, is purely prospective, that is, it only 
applies to restrictions adopted after May 11, 1995. 36 This represents a significant limitation on the 
scope of the law.  The Act also includes several other exemptions, including for “temporary” 
limitations on real property use (e.g., development moratoria), impacts to private property resulting 
from government efforts to abate or otherwise address a “public nuisance” or a “noxious use of 
private property,” as well as government actions “taken to grant relief” to a developer or other 
property owner under the Act (i.e., neighbors cannot assert a claim under the Act on the ground that 
they have been harmed by relief granted to a claimant objecting to regulations as too 
burdensome).37 
To initiate a proceeding, a land owner must submit a “claim” along with a “bona fide, valid 
appraisal that supports the claim and demonstrates the loss in fair market value to the real 
property.”38 The government must provide written notice of the claim to members of the public 
who were “parties” to the underlying administrative proceeding, to owners of contiguous 
properties, and to the Florida Department of Legal Affairs.39 Within 180 days of receipt of the 
claim (90 days in the case of agricultural lands), the government must respond with a “written 
settlement offer.”40 The “offer” can run the gamut from complete rejection of the claim, to 
modification of the regulatory action, to purchase of the property, to new conditions or mitigation 
measures. 
If a settlement is reached and the government agrees to modify its decision, “the relief 
granted shall protect the public interest served by the regulations at issue and be the appropriate 
relief necessary to prevent the government regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the 
property.”41 If the settlement “would have the effect of contravening the application of a statute as 
it would otherwise apply to the subject real property,”  the parties must obtain Circuit Court 
approval of the settlement agreement.42 
36 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(12).  See also id. (stating that an amendment to a pre-existing restriction 
“gives rise to a cause of action . . . only to the extent that the application of the amendatory 
language imposes an inordinate burden apart from the law, rule, regulation, or ordinance being 
amended” and that the Act does not apply to any rule, regulation, or ordinance “formally noticed 
for adoption” prior to the Act’s effective date). 
37 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(3)(e).  In addition, the Act excludes claims based on government 
transportation facilities, state, regional, or local actions under delegated federal authority, and 
repetitive claims for loss in value to the same property.  FLA. ST. ANN. §§ 70.001(10), (3)(c), (9). 
38 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(4)(a). 
39 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(4)(b). 
40 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(4)(c). 
41 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(11)(d). 
42 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(11)(d). 
If the parties fail to reach agreement, the government must issue a “ripeness decision” 
specifying what property uses it will allow.43 Upon issuance of this decision (or if the government 
fails to issue a decision), the land owner can sue in Circuit Court for compensation or other relief.44 
If the court determines that the government action imposed an inordinate burden it must impanel a 
jury to fix appropriate compensation.45 The Act provides that the jury’s compensation award  
shall be determined by calculating the difference in the fair market value of the real property, 
as it existed at the time of the governmental action at issue, as though the owner had the 
ability to attain the reasonable investment-backed expectation or was not left with uses that 
are unreasonable, whichever the case may be, and the fair market value of the real property, 
as it existed at the time of the governmental action at issue, as inordinately burdened, 
considering the settlement offer together with the ripeness decision, of the governmental 
entity or entities.46 
Given the Act’s unique, two-part definition of “inordinate burden,” it is ambiguous how 
compensation is supposed to be calculated; in particular, it is debatable whether the level of 
compensation should differ depending on whether the claimant bases his claim on the alleged 
frustration of investment expectations or the alleged unreasonableness of his remaining uses.  
 To encourage settlement, the Act provides that a claimant who prevails in court may recover 
his reasonable attorneys fees and costs from the government, if the court determines that “the 
settlement offer, including the ripeness decision, of the governmental entity did not constitute a bona 
fide offer to the property owner which reasonably would have resolved the claim.”47 On the other 
hand, a prevailing government defendant is also entitled to recover reasonable fees and costs from 
the property owner if the court determines that the owner declined a reasonable settlement offer.48 
The final provision of the Bert Harris Act states, somewhat surprisingly, “This section does 
not affect the sovereign immunity of government.” 49 On its face, this provision appears to bar 
claims for monetary relief from government, undercutting the purpose of the Act to create a new 
monetary remedy against government.  While the meaning of this provision is grist for continuing 
debate, the Florida Third District Court of Appeals ruled that it should not be read to prohibit an 
award of monetary compensation.50 
Nothing in the Bert Harris Act explicitly speaks to the rights of the public to participate in 
proceedings under the Act.  
 
43 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(5)(a). 
44 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(5)(b). 
45 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(6)(b). 
46 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(6)(b). 
47 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(6)(c). 
48 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(6)(c). 
49 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(13). 
50 Royal World Metropolitan, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 863 So.2d 320 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003). 
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The Dispute Resolution Act. The Dispute Resolution Act, which was adopted at the same 
time as the Bert Harris Act, grants regulated land owners a special opportunity to seek regulatory 
relief.  Although the Act does not directly limit government authority or explicitly grant land owners 
new substantive rights, the Act puts a powerful thumb on the scales of public decision-making in 
favor of property owners.  Unlike the Bert Harris Act, which only applies prospectively, the Dispute 
Resolution Act applies regardless of when the regulation was adopted. 
A property owner who believes that a regulation “is unreasonable or unfairly burdens the 
use of the owner’s real property” may initiate a proceeding under the Act by “fil[ing] a request for 
relief” with the government.51 The Act does not define the terms “unreasonable” or “unfair,” 
though it seems clear, given the purpose of the Act to provide additional relief to regulated property 
owners, that they are not supposed to be equated with the constitutional takings test.  The 
government is required to forward the request for relief to a special magistrate who is mutually 
acceptable to the government and the property owner.52 
The government also must provide a copy of the request for relief to contiguous property 
owners and to “[a]ny substantially affected party” who substantively participated in the underlying 
administrative proceeding.53 These persons may request permission to participate in the 
proceeding, but participation “is limited to addressing issues raised regarding alternatives, 
variances, or other types of adjustment to the development order or enforcement action which may 
impact their substantial interests. ” 54 Moreover, the Act indicates that members of the public “shall 
not be granted party or intervenor status. ” 55 
The magistrate must hold a hearing on the request for relief, which must be “informal and 
open to the public.”56 The Act emphasizes that “[t]he object of the hearing is to focus attention on 
the impact of the governmental action giving rise to the request for relief,” and to “explore 
alternatives” in terms of granting regulatory relief.57 The magistrate’s primary responsibility is “to 
facilitate a resolution of the conflict” that addresses the claimant’s concerns and reduces regulatory 
burdens.58 
Following the hearing, the magistrate must prepare a written recommendation based on her 
findings, including any recommendations that the government “reduce[] restraints on the use of the 
owner’s real property.” 59 The Act, unlike the Bert Harris Act, contains no provision addressing 
 
51 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(4). 
52 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(4). 
53 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(5). 
54 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(12). 
55 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(12). 
56 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(17). 
57 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(17). 
58 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(17)(a). 
59 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(19). 
potential conflicts between the outcome of the mediation process and established laws and 
regulations. 
The government must respond to the magistrate’s recommendation by accepting, modifying, 
or rejecting it.60 If the land owner and government agree on how to modify the restrictions, the 
government will proceed to implement the solution through the normal land use process.  The Act 
states that a magistrate’s recommendation is not sufficient, by itself, to amend a community’s 
comprehensive plan, but the recommendation will be treated as “data in support of” such an 
amendment.61 Comprehensive plan amendments necessary to implement a magistrate’s 
recommendation are exempt from the normal twice-a-year limit on plan amendments imposed by 
the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act.62 
If the government rejects the magistrate’s recommendations, or the parties are otherwise 
unable to agree, the government must issue “a written decision . . . that describes as specifically as 
possible the use or uses available to the subject real property.”63 In other words, even if the parties 
fail to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, the government must record whether the mediation 
process has led the government to change its position.  The magistrate’s findings also “may serve 
as an indication of sufficient hardship to support modification, variances, or special exemptions,”64 
meaning that a magistrate’s recommendation may provide the legal basis for challenging the 
government’s failure to grant regulatory relief.  This threat is obviously designed to encourage the 
government to accept the magistrate’s recommendations and authorize development.   
The Consequences of the Florida Property Rights Legislation
Our basic conclusion is that the Florida property rights legislation, and the Bert Harris Act 
in particular, has significantly altered the balance of power between developers and the public and 
made it virtually impossible for government to adopt and enforce new land use or environmental 
regulations.  This conclusion closely tracks the findings of the only other recent, systematic 
assessment of the effects of the Florida property rights legislation, published in 2005, which 
concluded, among other things, that the Bert Harris Act has “tipp[ed] the balance in favor of land 
owners by freezing government regulatory activity after the date of the Act’s inception,” 
“fundamentally restricted [the ability of planners and attorneys] to do the[ir] job[s],” and created a 
general “regulatory chill” in the state.65 Even the eponymous sponsor of the Bert Harris Act has 
some reservations about the legislation; in a 2006 interview, Bert J. Harris, Jr. was quoted as stating 
 
60 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(21). 
61 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(26).  The procedures that must be followed to amend a comprehensive 
plan are set forth in FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3184. 
62 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(26).  
63 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(22). 
64 FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(25). 
65 George Charles Homsy, The Land Use Planning Impacts of Moving “Partial Takings” from 
Political Theory to Legal Reality, 37 URB. LAW. 269, 286, 288 (2005). 
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that “although the bill was designed to prevent government from indiscriminately engaging in 
actions just short of a ‘taking’ of a land owner’s property, he never envisioned it as a development 
shelter.”66
Claims Data. According to records maintained by the Florida Department of Legal Affairs, 
as of February 2008, property owners had filed 202 Bert Harris Act claims with state, regional, and 
local governments, and property owners had filed 76 claims under the Dispute Resolution Act.  
Some indeterminate fraction of the Bert Harris Act claims subsequently evolved into full-blown 
litigation.  It is doubtful that these data are completely accurate,67 but the Department’s figures 
represent the best information available. 
 The number of claims filed in Florida over the past 13 years is significantly smaller than the 
number of claims filed under Oregon Measure 37 during the three years that that legislation was in 
effect.  This disparity in numbers is mostly due to the fact that the Bert Harris Act, the more potent 
of the two parts of the Florida legislation, applies only prospectively; the vast majority of the 
thousands of claims filed under Measure 37 were based on regulations enacted prior to the 
measure’s adoption.  In addition, the smaller number of claims under the Bert Harris Act may be 
due to the fact that claimants must submit a “bona fide, valid appraisal” along with their requests 
for relief; the courts have said that failure to satisfy this condition mandates rejection of a claim.68 
Measure 37 included no similar requirement. 
 More importantly, however, the number of claims and lawsuits filed in Florida provides only 
limited insight into the impact of the property rights legislation.  As discussed below, some 
communities have decided against adopting new regulations because of the prospect of claims, and 
other communities have withdrawn or relaxed regulations in the face of threats that Bert Harris Act 
claims would be filed.  These impacts appear to be by far the most significant consequence of the 
Bert Harris Act. 
Litigation Activity. Developers have filed a sufficient number of successful lawsuits under 
the Act to confirm the expansiveness of the inordinate burden test.  Several developers have 
succeeded in obtaining financial recoveries under the Act, albeit typically through a settlement after 
filing a lawsuit demanding compensation.  In Aquaport, L.C. v. Collier County, following the 
developer’s filing of an application with Collier County to construct a 10-story, 68-unit hotel, the 
County amended its development code to limit density, forcing the developer to build a smaller 15-
unit condominium.  The Circuit Court ruled that the amendment constituted an inordinate burden, 
 
66 Mitchell Pellachia, Bert J. Harris Act Looms over Alaska Parcel Concessions, MIAMI SUN POST,
July 21, 2006. 
67 For example, Hillsborough County has had a total of 23 Dispute Resolution Act cases, but the 
state database indicates the County has had only 7 cases.  Interview with Paula Harvey, Director, 
Hillsborough County Planning & Zoning Division, in Tampa, Florida, Feb. 20, 2008. 
68 See, e.g., Osceola County v. Best Diversified, Inc, 936 So.2d 55 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006). 
and the County settled the case by paying the developer $2.75 million.69 In another case, the City 
of Miami Beach reportedly settled a Bert Harris Act claim based on a reduced floor area restriction 
by purchasing the property, which was adjacent to city hall, for municipal use.70 Significantly, 
apparently no Florida court, at any level, has rejected a claim under the Act on the ground that the 
regulation was not sufficiently burdensome to rise to the level of an inordinate burden.   
Despite these litigation successes, there has been, as one commentary observes, an 
“unanticipated dearth of litigation” under the Act.71 All told, the Bert Harris Act has probably 
generated fewer than several dozen lawsuits since its adoption.  Even more remarkable, the appellate 
courts have issued almost no decisions providing guidance on how to interpret the Act.  The Florida 
Supreme Court has declined every opportunity to hear a case involving a Bert Harris Act claim,72 
and the Courts of Appeals have issued only a handful of reported decisions.  As to the inordinate 
burden standard, the Fifth District Court of Appeals has observed that the Bert Harris Act “creates 
a separate and distinct cause of action for property owners where governmental regulation has 
‘inordinately burdened’ the property, but does not amount to a ‘taking’ under the Florida or federal 
constitutions. ” 73 In that case the Court affirmed rejection of a claim based on Marion County’s 
refusal to extend the term of a permit authorizing operation of a waste disposal facility, reasoning 
that since the owner’s permit to operate the facility was originally time limited, the owner lacked the 
investment-backed expectations necessary to support a claim.74 But, beyond this, the Courts of 
Appeals have said essentially nothing about how to determine when the Act requires payment of 
compensation.75 
69 Ronald L. Weaver & Joni Armstrong Coffey, PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION 
LEGISLATION: STATUTORY CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FROM GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION 14 (Fla. Bar 
2007).  
70 Homsy, Land Use Planning Impacts, 37 URB. LAW. at 289. 
71 Weaver & Coffey, PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION LEGISLATION 43. 
72 See Brevard County v. Stack, 949 So.2d 197 (Fla. 2007) (denying review); Palm Beach Polo, 
Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 929 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 2006) (denying review); City of Miami Beach v. 
Royal World Metropolitan, Inc., 895 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2005) (denying review).  
73 Holmes v. Marion County, 960 So.2d 828, 829 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Osceola County,
936 So.2d at 58 n. 3). 
74 Holmes, 960 So.2d at 829. 
75 The other reported appellate decisions under the Act have dealt with collateral issues such as 
whether the regulated activity represented a nuisance, see Osceola County, 936 So.2d at 60 n. 5, 
whether the claim for relief was accompanied by a bona fide, valid appraisal, see id., whether the 
restriction was based on a pre-1995 law, see Palm Beach Polo, 918 So.2d 988, and whether the 
claimant met the schedule governing prosecution of Bert Harris Act claims.  See Russo Ass’n, Inc v. 
City of Dania Beach Code Enforcement Board, 920 So.2d 716 (Fla. Ct. App.  2006); Sosa v. City 
of West Palm Beach, 762 So.2d 981 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000).  See also Osceola County, 830 So.2d 
139 (striking down provision of the Bert Harris Act that authorized an interlocutory appeal from a 
trial court finding that a government action resulted in an inordinate burden).  In response to this 
decision, the Supreme Court adopted FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(c) allowing such interlocutory 
appeals.  See Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 894 So.2d 202 (Fla. 2005). 
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What explains this small volume of litigation and the lack of appellate court guidance?  
There are several plausible, overlapping explanations.  The Act’s chilling effect has undoubtedly 
derailed regulatory initiatives that would have produced litigation if they had been implemented.  
The numerous unanswered questions about the Act may make potential claimants reluctant to invest 
the time and money to litigate claims.  The Act’s provision awarding attorneys fees and costs to a 
prevailing party may have created an additional disincentive for litigation.  The Florida courts also 
may be reluctant to grapple with the challenge of developing a new statutory doctrine of regulatory 
takings that is vaguely related to the constitutional doctrine yet different and more protective of 
property rights.  Finally, the Florida courts, which probably have some institutional commitment to 
the established constitutional takings standard,76 may be reluctant to acknowledge how dramatically 
the legislature has transformed property rights protection in Florida. 
An ironic, unfortunate and no doubt unintended consequence of the lack of judicial 
engagement with the Act is that it has increased the burden the Act imposes on the state and local 
governments.  As one commentator has observed, “The level of uncertainty about the meaning of 
the Act leaves a wide playing field for litigants to advance an interpretation that favors them.”77 
This uncertainty has increased the litigation risks to governments facing claims, which in turn has 
increased the Act’s chilling effect, the topic to which we now turn. 
The Regulatory Chill. In the absence of significant litigation, the primary effect of the Act 
has been to discourage governments from adopting new regulatory restrictions.  There are two 
kinds of evidence for this chilling effect: examples of regulatory proposals that communities put 
forward and later abandoned in the face of a threat that the regulation might generate Bert Harris 
Act claims, and direct assertions by public officials that such a chilling effect exists.   
For example, one Florida city reportedly hired a consultant to prepare a historic preservation 
ordinance but decided against adopting the ordinance upon advice from the City Attorney that it 
would likely expose the city to suit under the Bert Harris Act.78 Similarly, Palm Beach County 
abandoned plans to reduce the permitted intensity of development in a 20,500-acre agricultural 
reserve east of the Everglades based on legal advice that the additional restrictions could trigger 
claims under the Act.79 In another example, Fort Lauderdale proposed to rewrite its zoning code to 
create transitional zones between residential and commercial areas but, according to a former 
 
76 In one leading Florida takings case, Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 
1981), the Florida Supreme Court rejected a taking claim based on a development order that 
required the owner to retain half of the property (a large mangrove forest) in its natural condition.  
The adoption of this type of regulatory restriction would almost certainly constitute an inordinate 
burden under the Bert Harris Act. 
77 Susan L. Trevarthen, Advising the Client Regarding Protection of Property Right—Harris Act 
and Inverse Condemnation Claims, 78-AUG. FLA. BAR  J. 61, 64 (July/Aug. 2004). 
78 Hunt, Property Rights and Wrongs, 48 FLA. L. REV. at 718 n 57.  
79 George Bennett, New Law Foils Plan to Cut Ag Reserve Development, PALM BEACH POST, May 
25, 1995. 
planner for the City, “With Bert Harris, we just aborted that.”80 It is likely that these examples are 
representative of a broader pattern, but absent a systematic survey it is impossible to know the full 
extent of the chilling effect. 
Various public statements by local officials and government attorneys also support the 
conclusion that the chilling effect is real.  Tim Jones, Deputy Assistant County Attorney for Lee 
County acknowledged that the Bert Harris Act “sometimes affects the way public officials in Lee 
County and elsewhere make zoning decisions.” 81 He explained that “[e]lected officials have been 
reluctant to pass laws that could expose them someday to the Bert Harris Act.”82 Similarly, George 
Forbes, Jacksonville Beach City Manager, stated that the Act “has a chilling effect because 
government officials are afraid the city will be liable to the property owners who can claim that a 
denial of their permit will reduce their property’s fair market value and entitle them to 
compensation.” 83 David Dermer, the Mayor of Miami Beach, said that “Commissioners have used 
the Harris Act as an excuse to shy away from zoning changes,”84 and that threats of “[m]illions 
and millions of dollars have been used as a hammer by the development community” to obtain 
approval of development projects.85 In the same vein, David Jordan, Deputy General Counsel for 
Florida’s Department of Community Affairs, stated “I think the chilling effect has been the major 
impact” of the Bert Harris Act and that “Governments have been wary of the law so they have 
tended not to make any changes. ” 86 Again, absent a statewide survey it is difficult to know how 
widespread this sentiment is.  But these public statements certainly suggest a common viewpoint on 
the issue among government attorneys and other officials. 
Developers and their attorneys essentially view the Bert Harris Act in the same light.  Chuck 
Mitchell, a Tallahassee developer, observed that the Bert Harris Act gave developers “a mechanism 
to get government’s attention.” 87 He stated that the Bert Harris Act was “all he needed” to get one 
development project approved.88 Threats of Bert Harris Act claims have become a regular part of 
the real estate business in Florida.89 Developers’ attorneys describe how they routinely raise the 
 
80 Homsey, Land Use Planning Impacts, 37 URB. LAW. at 290. 
81 Don Ruane, Lee Blasted in Claim Over Digging Rights, NEWS-PRESS, June 11, 2003. 
82 Id. 
83 Caren Burmeister, Council Opposes Property Act Change Amendment Would Make It 
Retroactive, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Mar. 19, 2003. 
84 Nicole White, Miami Beach, Fla., Wins Zoning Case; Officials Call Decision Pivotal, MIAMI 
HERALD, Aug. 4, 2002. 
85 Id. 
86 Dave Hogan, Mapping Out Land Compensation, OREGONIAN, Mar. 12, 2001. 
87 Geri Throne, A Real Balancing Act, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 18, 1999. 
88 Id. 
89 See, e.g., Judy Berman, Challenges likely to new restrictions, FLORIDA TODAY, Dec. 30, 2002 
(describing threats of Bert Harris Act claims against the City of Cocoa Beach after it imposed 
height and density limits, down-zoned certain commercial properties, and imposed a temporary 
building moratorium); Drew Dixon, Property Owner Says it is suing city over Wal-Mart; The 
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specter of Bert Harris Act liability when speaking with government officials about land use issues.  
One attorney reported that he had threatened to assert Bert Harris Act claims “hundreds of 
times.” 90
This evidence, albeit anecdotal, suggests that the primary effect of the Bert Harris Act has 
been to stop governments, particularly at the local level, from adopting new laws and regulations that 
they likely would have adopted in the Act’s absence.  The ultimate effect has been to undermine the 
capacity of Florida’s democratic institutions to respond to the will of the public, and to reduce the 
protections for land and other natural resources that Floridians would otherwise enjoy. While 
Florida has experienced torrid growth for many decades, the Act made it more difficult for the 
public to manage growth and mitigate its consequences. 
Regulatory Roll Backs. The other major effect of the Bert Harris Act has been to force 
communities to rescind or relax regulations in the face of specific Bert Harris Act claims or threats 
of such claims.  Thus, even when communities have been able to overcome the Act’s chilling effect 
and adopt new regulations, they have often been forced to roll back the restrictions after the fact.  
Some examples include: 
• In June 2007, the Fort Lauderdale City Commission granted a historic designation 
to Stranahan House, a century-old house built by city pioneers Frank and Ivy 
Stranahan.  A few months later, the City’s Historic Preservation Board relied on the 
designation to deny a certificate of appropriateness for a planned 38-unit 
condominium project on an adjacent property.  The developer responded by 
demanding $120 million in compensation under the Bert Harris Act and on other 
grounds.  Attorneys for the developer publicly stated that the claim was not a threat 
but rather a “reminder of consequences,”91 and fliers were mailed to city residents 
depicting a gambler’s roulette wheel and reading: “The city of Fort Lauderdale 
can’t risk a $120 million bet.”92 On appeal, the City Commission voted 3 to 2 to 
overturn the Historic Preservation Board, relying on advice from the City Attorney 
that rejecting the development application would have “serious negative  
 
company had planned to lease its site to the retailer, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Oct. 11, 2006 
(describing a threat of a Bert Harris Act claim by owner of a proposed Wal-Mart site). 
90 Interview with Clifford A. Schulman, Partner, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, in Miami, Florida, Mar. 
14, 2008. 
91 Brittany Wallman, Condo developer might seek damages from Fort Lauderdale: Stalled for 
nearly a decade, Builders of Icon condo await city action, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 27, 
2007.
92 Brittany Wallman, Fort Lauderdale OKs 42-story condo next to Stranahan House, SOUTH 
FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 2007. 
consequences for the city, primarily in the form of monetary damages.” 93 The 
developer has announced: “When completed, Icon Las Olas is planned to reach a 
height of 455 feet, taller than any other projects completed in the downtown area, 
making it the tallest building in Fort Lauderdale.”94 
• The voters of the City of West Palm Beach adopted a referendum decreasing the 
maximum permitted building height in the city from 15 stories to 5 stories, 
prompting the filing of several Bert Harris Act claims.  One developer, in 
anticipation of the new height restrictions, filed an application to develop two 15-
story buildings and a 6-story parking garage.  After the referendum was enacted, the 
City denied the application. The developer filed suit, and the Circuit Court ruled that 
the City was liable, rejecting the City’s argument that the voters’ approval of the 
referendum could not be ascribed to the City.  The City settled the case, permitting 
the developer to construct the two 15-story buildings, although the developer agreed 
to abandon the proposed 6-story parking garage.95
• In a long-running dispute involving the Portofino project on the southern tip of 
Miami Beach, the owner sued the City under the Bert Harris Act for $15 million 
after the City down-zoned the property, reducing the permitted square footage of 
development.  The City eventually settled, permitting development of the property 
with a square footage almost 40% in excess of what the zoning regulation allowed.96 
• In 2004, voters in Jacksonville Beach adopted a referendum imposing a 35-foot 
height cap on oceanfront development.  Southern Waterview, a developer that 
planned to build a 10-story oceanfront condominium, filed a $38 million Bert Harris 
Act claim, asserting that the new regulation interfered with its vested right to proceed 
with the project, based on the fact that it had filed its building plans with the City on 
November 1, 2004, a few days before the election.  Following the advice of the City 
Attorney that the developer had a potentially meritorious Bert Harris Act claim, the 
 
93 Id. 
94 Remax Beach Properties, Press Release, Icon Las Olas Fort Lauderdale Preconstruction Real 
Estate Condos, July 28, 2007, available at http://openpr.com/news/3298/ICON-Las-Olas-Fort-
Lauderdale-Preconstruction-Real-Estate-Condos.html. 
95 Fidelity Fed. Sav. Bank . v. City of West Palm Beach, BH-97-50-02, Cir. Ct. Case No. CL-97-
1470-AE (Fla. 15th Jud. Cir. 1997); Homsey, Land Use Planning Impacts, 37 URB. LAW. at 289; 
Ronald L. Weaver & Elizabeth Ynigo, Florida’s Bert Harris Private Property Rights Protection 
Act—An Owner’s Bridge Too Far? (Stearns Weaver 2005). 
96 Ronald L. Weaver, Bert Harris Update 2007, CLE International—Litigating Land Use (2007). 
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City allowed the developer to proceed with the project in violation of the new height 
cap.97 
• In 2003, Citrus County eliminated mixed-use coastal zoning in a portion of the 
community in favor of low density residential development.  A developer, W.W. 
Carthur, Jr., filed a $730,000 Bert Harris Act claim, and the City settled the claim by 
allowing the construction of a 50-unit waterfront subdivision with 35 boat docks.  In 
addition to being contrary to the amended zoning regulation, the development 
violated the County’s land use plan because it was within 5 miles of a nuclear power 
plant.98 
• In Martin County, a developer filed a $1.6 million Bert Harris Act claim based on 
wetlands regulations, and the County settled the dispute by allowing the developer to 
construct 150 luxury homes on the property, together with 155 boat docks and a 54-
slip commercial marina.99 
• In Collier County, after the County denied a developer permission to construct a 
111-acre golf course and resort within 35 feet of an active bald eagle nest site, the 
developer filed a claim under the Bert Harris Act demanding $285 million in 
compensation.  The County eventually settled by allowing the development to 
proceed in exchange for several commitments from the developer, including an 
agreement to construct an artificial tree, located offsite, designed to attract the eagles.  
County Commissioner Frank Halas was quoted as saying he “didn’t want to make 
a deal, but feared that the county could lose the lawsuit.” 100  
• In Bartow, after the City Council denied an application for a variance to construct a 
272-acre housing development, the developer filed a $9.34 million Bert Harris Act 
claim.  The City Attorney advised the City that it faced potential liability under the 
Act on the ground that the proposed development was consistent with the City’s 
comprehensive plan.  Based on this advice, a 3-2 majority of the City Council 
approved a modified version of the project allowing the housing development to 
proceed.  One of the commissioners objected that by approving the development the 
City “set[] a preceden[t] that we are going to let the developers rule with threats of 
 
97 Caren Burmeister, City struck deal with developer, records say; Southern Waterview wants to 
exceed the building height limit, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Mar. 3, 2007. 
98 Jorge Sanchez, Housing project suit ends with deal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006; 
Catherine E. Choichet, County: Not So Fast on Lawsuit Settlement, ST PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2005; Catherine E. Choichet, Commissioner Rues Vote on Suit, ST PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2005.
99 Homsey, Land Use Planning Impacts, 37 URB. LAW. at 289. 
100  Andrea Stetson, Developer buys condo rights near eagle nest; Collier is paid $6 million,
NEWS-PRESS, Sept. 1, 2006. 
Texas 
 
In 1995, after extensive debate, the Texas legislature passed and then Governor 
George W. Bush signed into law the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act.a The 
legislation is both complex and relatively limited in scope, which probably explains why 
property owners have rarely invoked the Act and why legal claims based on the Act have 
seldom if ever succeeded.  Indeed, over the thirteen years since it was adopted, there has 
been no reported court decision granting compensation or other relief under the Act.  It is 
less clear, especially in light of the pro-property rights culture in Texas, what if any chilling 
effect the Act may be having.  
 
The Act defines a “taking” as a government action that is “the producing cause of 
a reduction of at least 25 percent in the market value of the affected property.”b But, as a 
result of several large carve outs, the Act generally does not apply to actions by 
municipalities,c and also exempts actions “reasonably taken” to comply with federal or 
state legal mandates.d The Act also includes the familiar exemptions for regulations 
addressing nuisances and threats to public health and safety, as well as a hodge-podge of 
other exemptions relating to, for example, oil and gas development, hunting and fishing, 
floodplains, groundwater, land subsidence, and taxation.e
In a variation on the usual pay or waive formulation, the default remedy under the 
Act is an injunction barring enforcement of the regulation.f However, the government 
defendant has the option of paying the “damages as compensation” and keeping the 
offending regulation in place.g In an odd twist, because the Act’s definition of government 
actions giving rise to a taking is not restricted to actions limiting the use of property, a 
persuasive case can be made that the Act applies to government authorization of 
development activity that reduces the value of neighboring properties by 25% or more.h
The Act also requires governmental entities to prepare “Takings Impact 
Assessments” (TIA) prior to undertaking an action that “may result in a taking” within the 
meaning of the Act.i A private property owner affected by a governmental action that should 
have been, but was not analyzed in a TIA, can sue to invalidate the government action.j
a TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 2007.001-2007.045. 
b TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.002(5)(B)(ii).  Property under the Act means private “real 
property recognized by common law, including a groundwater or surface water right of any 
kind.”  Id. at § 2007.002(4). 
c TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.003(b)(1).  The Act applies to a municipal action only in the 
case of an action “that has effect in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality, 
excusing annexation, and that enacts or enforces an ordinance, rule, regulation, or plan that 
does not impose identical requirements or restrictions in the entire extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of the municipality.” Id. at § 2007.003(a)(3). 
d TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.003(b)(4). 
e TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.003(b). 
f TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.024(a). 
g TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.024(c). 
h Cf. Wilkinson v. Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board, 54 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2001) (affirming, on procedural grounds, dismissal of homeowners’ claims under 
the Act alleging that the value of their property was reduced by a runway expansion project). 
i TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.043. 
j TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.044. 
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In the handful of reported cases involving alleged takings under the Act, the claims 
have been dismissed for lack of standing,k on the ground that the government action was 
“reasonably taken” to comply with state law,l and on other, narrow procedural grounds.m
In another instance the Court of Appeals of Texas, reversing the trial court’s rejection of a 
taking claim on a motion for summary judgment, ruled that there were disputed issues of 
fact concerning whether the government action was covered by one of the Act’s 
exemptions.n There is no record of a final, definitive ruling that either invalidates a 
government action or awards compensation under the Act.  
 
In the other reported cases under the Act, the courts rejected claims that agencies 
violated the Act by not preparing TIAs.o One analysis conducted by the Texas Comptroller 
the year after the Act was passed concluded that four of the 131 state agencies that the 
Comptroller surveyed prepared TIAs.p There is no database of the number of TIAs 
prepared since, but our research indicates that, at a minimum, state agencies have recognized 
that the Act requires the preparation of TIAs and generally prepare them as required.q
k Chambers County v. TSP Development, Ltd., 63 S.W.3d 835, 837-38, 840 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2001) (developer with option contract for real property did not possess a property interest 
sufficient to support standing to sue under the Act). 
l McMillan v Northwest Harris County Mun. Util. Dist. No. 24, 988 S.W.2d 337, 340 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (levy of delinquent standby fees by utility district not a taking under 
the Act because “the levy was an action of a political subdivision that was reasonably taken 
to fulfill an obligation mandated by state law”). 
m Wilkinson, 54 S.W.3d at 18 (rejecting the argument that trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment for the government when the plaintiff ostensibly withdrew the taking 
claim, on the ground that the plaintiff failed to provide legal support for the appeal point). 
n South West Property Trust, Inc. v. Dallas County Flood Control Dist. No. 1, 136
S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (vacating and remanding judgment for flood control 
district because there were disputed issues as to whether a tax was mandated by state law). 
o Bragg v Edwards Aquifer Authority, 71 S.W.3d 729, 737 (Tex. 2002) (State agency’s 
adoption of well-permitting rules did not require the preparation of TIA because the action 
fell within Act’s exemption for actions taken to “prevent waste or to protect the rights of 
owners of interest in groundwater.”); Duncan v. Calhoun County Navigation District, 28
S.W.3d. 707, 711-12 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (TIA requirement did not apply to government 
decision about whether to exercise eminent domain, because eminent domain is expressly 
exempted from the Act). 
p See Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of New London, Babbitt 
v. Sweet Home, and Other Tales from the Supreme Court, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 680 
(2006) (citing John Sharp, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Report on the Private 
Real Property Preservation Act, (Senate Bill 14) 1, 6 (1997)). 
q See, e.g., TEX. ADMIN. CODE Title 4, Part 1, Chapter 1(A), Rule § 1.41, available at 
<http://secure.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/readtac$ext.TacPage?sl=R&app=9&p_dir=&p_rloc=
&p_tloc=&p_ploc=&pg=1&p_tac=&ti=4&pt=1&ch=1&rl=41> (for an example of an 
agency’s TIA regulation); Texas Association of Counties, Exemption from takings law 
requires immediate, COUNTY ISSUES, Apr. 1997, available at 
<http://www.county.org/resources/library/cissue/LN/vol7no12/Record714216.html> 
(discussing costs imposed on Harris County by the TIA requirement); Texas Commission 
on Environmental Quality, Proposed Regulations Chapter 290 - Public Drinking Water 
Rule Project No. 2006-045-290-PR, at 115-117, available at 
<http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/assets/public/legal/rules/rule_lib/proposals/06045290_pro_clea
n.pdf> (for an example of a TIA). 
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lawsuits,” and that the City would “be intimidated with threats of lawsuits if we do 
not approve zoning or whatever it is they want.” 101  Disappointed with this about-
face, a citizen group called the “Enough Already Committee” mounted a 
referendum petition to overturn the City Council’s action and subsequently sued the 
City for failing to respond to the group’s petition.  As of April 2008, the litigation 
was still pending.102  
While these appear to be the most significant examples in which developers used the Bert 
Harris Act to force communities to roll back regulations, this list is by no means exhaustive.  Yet 
just this handful of cases, many of which were covered extensively in local newspapers, 
undoubtedly sent a powerful message to communities considering adopting new regulations and 
reinforced the Act’s chilling effect. 
The Dispute Resolution Act. There is comparatively little evidence about the effects of the 
Dispute Resolution Act, largely because the Act is designed to encourage informal resolution of 
property owners’ complaints about regulatory burdens and does not create judicially enforceable 
legal rights.  Nonetheless, our examination of the experience of Hillsborough County suggests that 
the Act significantly benefits developers at the expense of the broader community.  Twenty three 
Dispute Resolution Act claims have been filed with the County since the Act’s adoption.  In twelve 
of these cases, or more than 50%, the County reversed its initial rejection of the development 
application and approved the project in some modified form.  Even discounting for the probability 
that claimants who pursued this process were relatively likely to have sympathetic cases, these data 
suggest that the Dispute Resolution Act provides a significant avenue for obtaining regulatory 
relief.  One county official described citizens’ common frustration and surprise when they learned, 
after the completion of the normal regulatory review process, that the Dispute Resolution Act 
granted developers a one-sided opportunity to take another bite at the proverbial apple.103  
101  Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Memorandum of Law at Exhibit C: Minutes, Bartow City 
Commission, Regular Meeting, Monday, Nov. 5, 2007, Pfeiffer v. City of Bartow (Fla. 10th Jud. 
Cir. Ct.). 
102  Suzie Schottelkotte, Bartow faces key vote on project, LEDGER, Sept. 2, 2007; Metro, 
Commission OKs controversial development, LEDGER, Sept. 5, 2007; Suzie Schottelkotte, Legal 
Threat Comes From New Direction: Approval of Large Housing Development Brings Challenge 
From Projects Neighbor: Bartow Commission, LEDGER, Sept. 6, 2007; Suzie Schottelkotte, Bartow 
Residents Launch Petition Drive; They Want to Force A Referendum on the Proposed Wind 
Meadows Project, LEDGER, Sept. 16, 2007; Suzie Schottelkotte, Bartow residents get a voice in 
lawsuit over housing development, LEDGER, Oct. 28, 2007. 
103  Interview with Paula Harvey, Director, Hillsborough County Planning & Zoning Division, in 
Tampa, Florida, Feb. 20, 2008.  The Dispute Resolution Act has generated even less reported case 
law than the Bert Harris Act, and it has been largely procedural in nature.  See Peninsular Prop. 
Braden River, LLC v. City of Bradenton, 965 So.2d 160 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting 
constitutional challenge to the Act’s provision tolling the jurisdictional time limit for filing judicial 
challenges to agency administrative orders); Hanna v. Environmental Protection Commission, 735
So.2d 544 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a letter accompanied by a scientist’s field report 
25
What Comes Next?
The politics of land use in Florida bring to mind the image of two locomotives on a single 
track racing toward a collision.  One locomotive is the Bert Harris Act, which appears to be gaining 
considerable momentum after 13 years as communities settle claims for millions of dollars or, much 
more commonly, forego adopting new regulations or abandon newly adopted regulations.  In some 
quarters, political support for the property rights agenda remains strong; virtually every year bills 
are introduced in the Florida legislature to clarify and strengthen the Bert Harris Act.104  Despite the 
Act’s chilling effect on government’s capacity to regulate, so far there has been little if any public 
discussion about limiting the scope of the Act.  
 The other locomotive is the Florida Hometown Democracy movement, a grassroots effort to 
promote greater citizen participation in and control over the land use regulatory process.105  The 
supporters of Hometown Democracy propose to place a constitutional amendment on the 2010 
state ballot that would require voter approval for any change to a local government’s comprehensive 
plan.106  The driving force behind this effort is the perception that the public has been excluded 
from meaningful participation in the development review process and that close collaboration 
between developers and local officials has produced pro-developer land use decisions.107  
According to the Hometown Democracy website: “Citizens in a community have rights, too.  We 
have the right to demand that our ‘quality of life’ not be harmed by endless construction. . . .  Our 
elected officials take an oath to protect the public interest.  But too many county and city 
commissioners just cannot say no to comprehensive plan amendments that are destructive to a 
community’s well being.” 108  
The property rights legislation and the Hometown Democracy movement are on a collision 
course in the sense that Hometown Democracy is partly a reaction to the fall out from the property 
 
indicating that parcel might contain wetlands was not a development order triggering the Act’s 
dispute resolution process); Scott v. Polk County, 793 So.2d 85 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that 
Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin special master proceeding under the Act). 
104  See Trevarthen, Advising the Client, 78-AUG. FLA. BAR  J. at 64.  In the 2008 legislative session, 
one bill would have redefined the regulations subject to the inordinate burden standard to include 
development moratoria, reduced the waiting period before claimants could go to court, and clarified 
that the enactment (as opposed to the application) of a new law or regulation does not trigger the 
limitations period for filing claims.  H.B. 881 (2008).  This amendment failed to pass. 
105  Florida Hometown Democracy, About Us, at http://www.floridahometown 
democracy.com/about.html. 
106  Florida Hometown Democracy, Petition, at http://www.floridahometowndemocracy. 
com/documents/FHD_Petition2-Final.pdf. See also Dan Dewitt, Decision on Development Worth 
Revisiting, ST PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 28, 2008. 
107  Patrick Slevin, No: Let’s update meeting Protocol and heal trust in local government, TC 
PALM, July 24, 2007, at http://www.tcpalm.com/news/2007/jul/24/con-florida-hometown-
democracys-citizen-initiative/. 
108  Florida Hometown Democracy, About Us, at http://www.floridahometowndemocracy. 
com/about.html. 
rights legislation.  The basic purpose of the property rights legislation was to give developers more 
leverage in their dealings with government officials while limiting public involvement in the 
resolution of the claims.  Viewed in historical context, the Hometown Democracy movement 
appears to represent an understandable and not entirely unreasonable grassroots reaction to the 
success of the property rights movement in Florida.  
A more specific risk of a conflict arises from the fact that local communities sometimes have 
to adopt comprehensive plan amendments to implement settlements of claims under the Bert Harris 
or Dispute Resolution Acts.109  Under the Hometown Democracy proposal, voters could veto these 
amendments, with the result that governments threatened with expensive claims might find 
themselves blocked from making settlements.  Hometown Democracy, piled on top of the property 
rights legislation, threatens to produce a massive, and massively expensive, regulatory gridlock. 
The Florida property rights legislation is plainly one of the root causes of the citizen 
frustration driving the Hometown Democracy movement.  Rather than pursue an agenda that 
threatens the state with gridlock, supporters of the Hometown Democracy agenda, as well as those 
sympathetic to the concerns driving this movement, might consider addressing the frustrations with 
Florida’s land use policies more directly by seeking the reform, if not the repeal, of the property 
rights legislation itself. 
 
109  See FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3194(1)(a) (“After a comprehensive plan, or element or portion 
thereof, has been adopted in conformity with this act, all development undertaken by, and all actions 
taken in regard to development orders by, governmental agencies in regard to land covered by such 
plan or element shall be consistent with such plan or element as adopted.”). 
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III. Oregon Property Rights Legislation 
Introduction
On November 2, 2004, Oregon voters, by a margin of 61% to 39%, adopted Measure 37, a 
ballot title that read, “Government must pay owners or forgo enforcement, when certain land use 
restrictions reduce property value.” 110  The measure revolutionized property rights and the land use 
regulatory process in Oregon and unleashed a heated public debate about the takings issue, 
culminating three years later in another successful ballot measure (Measure 49) that substantially 
narrowed Measure 37. 
The contest over Measure 37 was in large part a battle over the consequences and future 
viability of Oregon’s well-known land use program.  Created under the leadership of Governor 
Tom McCall in the 1970’s, the program established a Department of Land Conservation and 
Development (DLCD), led by a Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC).111  
The LCDC was charged with establishing a set of state land use policy goals, which included a 
mandate for extensive public involvement in the land use program,112  a requirement that local 
governments establish urban growth boundaries “[t]o provide for an orderly and efficient transition 
from rural to urban land use,”113  and policies for the preservation of millions of acres of forest and 
agricultural lands for commercial farm and timber production.114  Local communities are required to 
prepare and regularly update local plans and regulations to conform to the state goals, a process 
overseen by the DLCD.115  In 1979, the legislature established a three-member Land Use Board of 
 
110  Oregon Office of the Sec’y of State, Certified Ballot Title for Measure 37 (Apr. 22, 2003), 
available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/irr/2004/036cbt.pdf; Oregon Sec’y of State, General 
Election Abstract of Votes on State Measure No. 37 (Nov. 2, 2004), available at 
http//www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov2204/abstract/m37.pdf.  In 2000, Oregon voters adopted 
Measure 7, a similar measure amending the Oregon Constitution, which was struck down by the 
Oregon Supreme Court on the ground that it violated the “single subject” rule.  See McPherson v. 
Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 312 (Or. 2006).   
111  Carl Abbott & Deborah Howe, The Politics of Land Use Law in Oregon: Senate Bill 100, 
Twenty Years After, 94 OR. HIST. Q. 5 (1993); Edward J. Sullivan, Remarks to University of 
Oregon Symposium Marking the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of SB 100, 77 OR. L. REV. 813 (1999). 
112  Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, Goal 1: Citizen Involvement, codified at OR.
ADMIN. CODE § 660-015-0000, available at http://www.lcd.state. 
or.us/LCD/docs/goals/goal1.pdf. 
113  Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, Goal 14: Urbanization, codified at OR.
ADMIN. CODE § 660-015-0000, available at http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/ 
docs/goals/goal14.pdf. 
114  Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, Goal 3: Agricultural Lands, codified at OR.
ADMIN. CODE § 660-015-0000, available at http://www.lcd.state.or.us/ 
LCD/docs/goals/goal3.pdf; Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, Goal 4: Forest 
Lands, codified at OR. ADMIN. CODE § 660-015-0000, available at 
http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/docs/goals/goal4.pdf.  See also OR. REV. ST. § 197.180; OR. REV.
ST. § 195.020. 
115  Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, Goal 2: Land Use Planning, codified at OR.
ADMIN. CODE § 660-015-0000, available at http://www.lcd. 
Appeals to hear appeals from local land use disputes.116  Generally speaking, in comparison with 
Florida’s land use program, the Oregon program is more prescriptive about what land uses are 
permitted where. 
The Oregon land use program has been both very popular within the state and a source of 
continuous public controversy.117  Several ballot measures have been presented to the voters to 
dilute the program, producing hard fought political contests, but none was ultimately successful.118  
The Oregon legislature has repeatedly debated the program and from time to time adopted 
amendments that have modestly weakened the original vision of Governor McCall and his allies and 
also made the program a good deal more complex and confusing to the public.119  Nonetheless, the 
basic structure of the program adopted in the 1970s remains in place today. 
The campaign on behalf of Measure 37 was led by Oregonians in Action (OIA), an effective 
property rights organization founded in large measure to counter-balance 1000 Friends of Oregon, 
the advocacy group founded by Governor McCall to support the Oregon land use program.120  OIA 
helped mount the successful takings challenge in the U.S. Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of 
Tigard,121  and led several vigorous campaigns to install property rights advocates on the Oregon 
Supreme Court.  Most significantly for present purposes, OIA is generally credited with drafting 
Measure 37 and organizing the campaign leading to its adoption.122  The pro-Measure 37 campaign 
reportedly raised approximately $1.2 million, which is substantially less than the $2,727,878 raised 
by the no campaign,123  but nonetheless prevailed. 
The basic theme of the yes campaign was “fairness,”  that is, that regulatory restrictions 
reduce the value of private property and therefore, as a matter of fairness, the public should either 
 
state.or.us/LCD/docs/goals/goal2.pdf. 
116  Or. Rev. St. §§ 197.805-197.855. 
117  See David Steves, A new look at land use; An Oregon task force resumes its work after a one-
year hiatus, REGISTER-GUARD, Mar. 11, 2008; Blaine Harden, Anti-Sprawl Laws, Property Rights 
Collide in Oregon, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 28, 2005; Timothy Egan, Oregon’s Property Rights 
Law Kicks In, Easing Rigid Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006. 
118  Michael C. Blumm, Enacting Libertarian Property: Oregon’s Measure 37 and Its 
Implications, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 279, 282 n. 8 (2007). 
119  See Sullivan, Remarks to University of Oregon Symposium, 77 OR. L. REV. at 814-16. 
120  David S. Hunnicutt, Oregon Land Use Regulation and Ballot Measure 37: Newton’s Third 
Law at Work, 36 ENVTL. L. 25, 41 (2006). 
121  512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
122  Dave Hunnicutt of Oregonians In Action—Stop 49 Campaign Spokesperson, at 
http://www.measure37watch.com/oregon_measure_37/2007/10/dave-hunicutt-o.html; Oregonians 
In Action File Measure 37 Compensation Claims for About $5 Million, Aug. 2007, at 
http://www.measure37watch.com/oregon_measure_37/2007/08/oregonians-in-a.html. 
123  Alan Pittman, Looming Sprawl, EUGENE WEEKLY, Jan. 25, 2007; Money in Politics Research 




pay “compensation” to those affected by the restrictions or forego their enforcement.124  The 
public face of the campaign was Dorothy English, a 92-year-old widow who objected to restrictions 
affecting a parcel she had purchased with her husband in 1953.  As related in numerous 
advertisements, their “dream was to someday divide the property, give some of it to [their] children 
and grandchildren, and sell the remainder for [their] retirement.” 125  These aspirations were 
supposedly dashed when Multnomah County rezoned the land as commercial forest land “even 
though there isn’t a commercial timber operation anywhere near [the] property.” 126  
One particular target of the yes campaign was a regulation that required owners of 
agricultural land to earn $80,000 per year in revenues in two out of three years before they could 
build a home on the property.127  Enacted as a control on hobby farming, the regulation was 
attacked as a pointless restriction on agricultural operators, such as vintners, whose vines take many 
years to produce salable grapes,128  and an unfair burden on retirees and other small-scale 
operators.129  Proponents of Measure 37 publicized an anecdote involving Eugene and Barbara 
Prete, who bought 20 acres in Oregon in 1990, planning to use the property for a retirement 
home.130  When they decided to retire, they were unable to build a home on the property due to the 
farm-income restriction.131  More generally, the yes campaign challenged restrictions on building 
individual homes on agricultural and forest lands as unnecessary, unfair, and unduly 
burdensome.132  
124  Oregon Official 2004 General Election Online Voters’ Guide, Measure 37, Arguments in 
Favor, available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/ 
guide/eas/m37_bt.html. 
125  Dorothy English, Measure 37, Argument in Favor, available at: 
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_fav.html. 
126  Id. 
127  See Laura Oppenheimer, Breaking Ground Land Owners Who Fought For Measure 37 Ready 
the First Cases, OREGONIAN, Nov. 22, 2004. 
128  Cf. Gov. Victor Atiyeh, Gov. Barbara Roberts, & John D. Gray, MEASURE 37 REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO SEN. FLOYD J. PROZANSKI, JR., REP. GREGORY H. MACPHERSON, CO-CHAIRS 
JOINT SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LAND USE FAIRNESS, 2007 LEGISLATIVE SESSION 19 (Mar. 21, 2007) 
(recommending modification of the $80,000 per year income rule as applied to wineries and fruit 
orchards). 
129  See, e.g., Randal O’Toole, THE FOLLY OF SMART GROWTH, REGULATION 21 (Cato Fall 2001); 
Eric Pryne, Voters in Oregon spoke loudly, but what were they trying to say?, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 
11, 2005; Laura Oppenheimer, Initiative Reprises Land Battle, OREGONIAN, Sept. 20, 2004; Dave 
Hunnicutt, Local Opinion, REGISTER-GUARD, Oct. 14, 2007. 
130  Barbara and Eugene Prete, Measure 37, Argument in Favor, available at: 
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_fav.html. 
131  Laura Oppenheimer, Initiative Reprises Land Battle, OREGONIAN, Sept. 20, 2004. 
132  See Bill Moshofsky, Regulatory Taking Compensation—The Successful Oregon Measure 37 
Initiative, Speech from the Ninth Annual National Conference on Private Property Rights, Property 
Rights Foundation of America, Inc., (2005), at 
http://prfamerica.org/speeches/9th/RegulatoryTakingCompensation.html; Eric Pryne, Voters in 
Oregon spoke loudly, but what were they trying to say?, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 11, 2005. 
The opposition campaign failed to develop a powerful public message or to galvanize the 
land use program’s supporters.133  The campaign’s lead message was that the measure would 
create “layers and layers of new government processes and procedures,” and make it “more 
difficult for new farmers to enter the farming business. ” 134  This anti-government theme apparently 
reinforced, rather than countered, the basic message of Measure 37 advocates.  The no campaign 
also emphasized the potential costs of the measure to taxpayers, and the likelihood that the measure 
would generate a great deal of litigation.135  These arguments proved inadequate to overcome the 
yes campaign’s appeal to fairness.  
The opposition campaign decided not to argue that the measure would undermine Oregon’s 
land use protections, apparently because of a concern that voters would view the argument as 
implausible.  The no campaign also decided against identifying the special interests backing the 
measure, in particular timber companies, based on the ultimately mistaken hope that some major 
timber companies whose resource base is protected by the land use system would publicly oppose 
Measure 37.136  Thus, the no campaign arguably omitted one of its strongest potential arguments.  
In reality, business interests “were the driving force behind the measure”137  and were its main 
beneficiaries. Timber companies, developers, and other businesses provided more than half of the 
funding for the yes campaign.138  The role of these special interests in the campaign was essentially 
ignored, leaving Dorothy English and other sympathetic individuals as Measure 37’s public 
advocates.139  
Factors other than the strengths and weaknesses of the campaigns for and against Measure 
37 also help explain its adoption.  Most current Oregon residents did not participate in the political 
battle over the adoption of the Oregon land use program,140  and some citizens arguably took for 
granted the benefits of the program.  Governor Ted Kulongoski was quoted as saying that he was 
 
133  See Blumm, Enacting Libertarian Property Values, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. at 306-307. 
134  Measure 37, Arguments in Opposition, available at 
<http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_opp.html>. 
135  Measure 37, Arguments in Opposition, available at 
<http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_opp.html>. 
136  See Blaine Harden, Oregon Rethinks Easing Land-Use Limits, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 11, 
2007.
137  To activist, measure 37 a bait and switch, OREGONIAN, Apr. 25, 2007; Robert Emmons, Speak 
out to Protect Our Land, REGISTER-GUARD, May 17, 2007. 
138  Measure 37 Campaign Donors With Measure 37 Claims, at 
http://www.measure37watch.com/oregon_measure_37/2007/09/measure-37-do-1.html; Money in 
Politics Research Action Project, Donors Who Gave More than Half the Money to the Measure 37 
Campaign File Over $600 million in Claims, Could Earn Windfall on Campaign Investment, Apr. 
19, 2007, at http://democracyreform.org/?q=041707release; David Sale, Measure 37 campaign 
donors stand to profit from claims, NEWBERG GRAPHIC, May 2, 2007. 
139  See Takings Initiatives Project, Ad Wars 2004, at http://www.takingsinitiatives.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87&itemid=54. 
140  1.5 million Oregonians (an over 70% increase in population) moved to the state after the 
comprehensive land-use statute was enacted. Census, Oregon Population Growth 1960-2000. 
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“not surprised [Measure 37] passed. Most Oregon voters don’t understand how land-use rules 
affect their everyday lives, giving the pro-37 camp the upper hand in the debate.”141  Media 
coverage of the ballot contest and the potential consequences if Measure 37 were adopted was 
anemic.  The Oregonian, the State’s leading newspaper, went so far, after the election, to publish an 
editorial by its public editor expressing regret that the newspaper had given only “limited coverage 
of the measure.”142  Finally, Measure 37 may not have been a priority for voters, who apparently 
focused their attention on other, more controversial 2004 ballot measures addressing the use of 
marijuana for medical purposes and gay marriage.143  
The adoption of Measure 37 unleashed a flood of claims against the state and local 
governments, extensive litigation, a renewed debate about the merits of Measure 37, and an intense 
policy discussion about how to deal with the unanticipated (or at least unpublicized) problems 
created by Measure 37.  Eventually, the state legislature adopted a comprehensive set of 
amendments to Measure 37, which were approved by the state’s voters on November 6, 2007.  In a 
nutshell, these amendments rescinded Measure 37 as to existing laws, and in exchange granted 
those who had filed claims under Measure 37 the opportunity to build up to three additional houses 
(and in some instances up to ten additional houses) on protected lands.  As to laws and regulations 
adopted in the future, Measure 49 left Measure 37 in place but significantly narrowed its scope. 
Measure 37
This section provides a sketch and analysis of the key provisions of Measure 37.  Because 
the measure was drafted by a small group of property rights advocates, and does not reflect the tug 
and pull of legislative politics, it was relatively succinct as well as extreme.  
Measure 37 mandated that government (state agencies and/or units of local or regional 
government) pay “just compensation” when it enacts or enforces a regulatory restriction that 
“reduce[s] the fair market value of [real] property, or any interest therein.” 144  The measure 
identified no threshold level of impact for making a claim.  However, the measure allowed 
government entities to avoid liability by “modify[ing],” remov[ing], or not apply[ing]” the 
 
141  See Laura Oppenheimer, Land-Use Laws on Turf that is Uncharted, OREGONIAN, Nov. 4, 2004. 
142  Michael Arrietta-Walden, the Public Editor, Measure 37 Coverage Was Too Limited, Late,
OREGONIAN, Nov. 14, 2004.   
143  National Conference of State Legislatures, Voters Decide High-Profile Issues on State Ballots,
Nov. 9, 2004, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/ 
statevote/ir2004.htm. 
144  Ballot Measure 37, available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/ 
guide/meas/m37_text.html. 
challenged regulation within a limited period after the filing of a claim.145  The popular shorthand 
description of Measure 37 was that it imposed a “pay or waive” mandate. 
Measure 37 was expansively retroactive.  Claimants eligible to challenge pre-existing 
regulations included owners who purchased property before the offending regulation was adopted, 
as well as owners who obtained property from a family member who acquired the property prior to 
the regulation’s adoption.  In practice, this meant that thousands of land owners were entitled to file 
claims based on Oregon’s comprehensive land use laws of the 1970s. 
If the government elected to pay, the “just compensation” was required to “be equal to the 
reduction in the fair market value of the affected property interest resulting from enactment or 
enforcement of the land use regulation as of the date the owner ma[de] written demand for 
compensation.” 146  While Measure 37 resulted in virtually no payments, the issue of how to 
calculate compensation under the measure was a matter of heated debate.147  Compensation could 
be paid from funds “specifically allocated” for that purpose, or from other “available funds.” 148  
If the government was unable or unwilling to pay, “the governing body responsible for 
enacting the land use regulation” was authorized to “modify, remove, or not to apply the land use 
regulation . . .  to allow the owner to use the property for a use permitted at the time the owner 
acquired the property.”149  On its face, this waiver authority could only affect regulations adopted 
while the current owner held the property, in contrast to a payment of compensation, which could 
reach regulations adopted during an ancestor’s tenure. 
The measure included five exemptions from the pay or waive mandate, including regulations 
that (1) restricted “activities commonly and historically recognized as public nuisances under 
common law;” (2) regulated “activities for the protection of public health and safety, such as fire 
and building codes, health and sanitation regulations, solid or hazardous waste regulations, and 
pollution control regulations;” (3) were necessary “to comply with federal law;” (4) restricted 
“the use of a property for the purpose of selling pornography or performing nude dancing;” or (as 
discussed above) (5) were enacted before the claimant, or a family member, acquired the 
property.150  
145  Id. Measure 37 mandated that government either pay compensation or waive the regulations 
within 180 days from the date the property owner filed his written demand; if the government was 
unable or unwilling to address the claim within 180 days, the owner was free to file a lawsuit 
seeking compensation.   
146  Id. 
147  See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan, Through a Glass Darkly: Measuring Loss Under Oregon’s 
Measure 37, 39 URB. LAW 563, 576-602 (2007) (surveying the alternative theories). 
148  Ballot Measure 37, available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/ 
guide/meas/m37_text.html. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
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To initiate a claim, a land owner was required to submit a “written demand” to the 
responsible government entity or entities, but there was no prescribed set of data or supporting 
documentation that had to be filed with the claim.151  The measure permitted state or local 
governments to adopt “procedures for the processing of claims,” but compliance with the 
procedures was not made a prerequisite for filing a claim and a claim could not be rejected for 
failure to follow the procedures.152  In addition, the measure stated that “A decision by a governing 
body under this act shall not be considered a land use decision as defined in ORS 197.015(10),”153  
making clear that government actions under Measure 37 were not subject to administrative review 
before the Land Use Board of Appeals.154  The measure included a soft two-year deadline for the 
filing of facial claims based on regulations in place on the date of adoption of Measure 37, after 
which claims based on such regulations could only be brought on an as applied basis.155  
The Consequences of Measure 37
Our basic conclusion is that Measure 37, if it had remained in place, would have essentially 
destroyed the Oregon land use program and, over time, encouraged a sprawling development pattern 
similar to that afflicting many other states. While the measure imposed a chill on new regulatory 
initiatives, as in Florida, the far more important consequence was the threatened unraveling of 
decades-old regulations limiting development outside of designated urban growth boundaries and 
protecting productive agricultural and forest lands.  
Claims Data. As of November 2007, when Measure 49 was enacted and the filing of new 
claims under Measure 37 ceased, property owners had filed 7,717 claims affecting approximately 
800,000 acres and demanding compensation totaling approximately $20 billion.156  
The large volume of claims filed under Oregon Measure 37 stands in dramatic contrast to 
the much smaller number of claims filed in Florida (and other states with takings legislation).  The 
primary reason for the relatively large number of claims in Oregon was the retroactive nature of 
Measure 37, which created a large universe of land owners immediately eligible to file claims.  In 
addition, Measure 37 imposed no filing requirements other than that the claims be in writing; 
claimants were not even required to submit an appraisal with their claims.  Thus, a simple one-page 
 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
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154  Rebekah R. Cook, Incomprehensible, Uncompensable, Unconstitutional: The Fatal Flaws Of 
Measure 37, 20 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 245, 256 (2005). 
155  Ballot Measure 37, available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/ 
guide/meas/m37_text.html. 
156  Portland State University, Measure 37: Database Development and Analysis Project, available at 
http://www.pdx.edu/ims/m37database.html#regioncounty (database including claims against the 
state, regional, and local governments); see also Oregon Department of Land Conservation and 
Development, Measure 37 Summaries of Claims, at 
http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/MEASURE37/summaries_of_claims.shtml (database including 
only state claims). 
document demanding millions of dollars commonly sufficed to initiate the Measure 37 process.  
Finally, as hundreds and then thousands of land owners filed claims, many of which were reported 
in the local media, other eligible claimants apparently decided to join “the crowd,” swelling the total 
number of claims. 
The majority of claims filed under Measure 37 involved residential development,157  but only 
a fraction of these claims were proposals to build single-family homes that were the focus of the 
public campaign on behalf of Measure 37.  One authoritative analysis of Measure 37 claims 
prepared for the Oregon legislature, which addressed claims involving residential projects, estimated 
that 40% of the residential claims involved proposals to build between one to three homes, 31% of 
the claims involved proposals to build four to nine residences, and 28% of the claims involved 
subdivisions of over ten lots. 158  The claims involving larger subdivisions were disproportionately 
important in terms of area, covering 71% of the total acreage affected by Measure 37 residential 
claims.159  Thus, focusing on the residential claims alone, the primary beneficiaries were land 
developers rather than individuals seeking a home for themselves and their families. 
500,000 acres of farmland were targeted with claims involving residential subdivisions and 
other development.160  The majority of the Measure 37 claims were filed in the Willamette Valley, 
Oregon’s richest agricultural area,161  and the majority of these were on land zoned for agricultural 
use.162  In Washington County, located in the Willamette Valley, Measure 37 claims were filed on 
20% of the county’s 121,719 acres of farmland.163  
157  According to the Portland State University database of Measure 37 claims, out of the 7,717 
claims that were filed, approximately 57% of claimants sought to build homes, approximately 1% 
sought some other use, and the remaining 41% involved claims where the claimant did not specify a 
proposed use or no use was proposed. Portland State University, Measure 37: Database 
Development and Analysis Project, available at 
http://www.pdx.edu/ims/m37database.html#regioncounty.   
158  Atiyeh, et al., MEASURE 37 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO SEN. FLOYD J. PROZANSKI, JR., 
REP. GREGORY H. MACPHERSON, CO-CHAIRS at 12.  For another analysis of Measure 37 claims, see 
Henry R. Richmond & Timothy G. Houchen, MEASURE 37, IS IT DOING WHAT OREGON VOTERS 
WANTED? 1, 3-6, 7-10 (American Land Institute Sept. 17, 2007). 
159  Atiyeh, et al., MEASURE 37 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO SEN. FLOYD J. PROZANSKI, JR., 
REP. GREGORY H. MACPHERSON, CO-CHAIRS at 12.   
160  Brian Hines, Restore fairness of property rights, STATESMAN JOURNAL, Nov. 4, 2007; 
Richmond & Houchen, MEASURE 37 at 1, 7-10. 
161  Richmond & Houchen, MEASURE 37 at 11-13; Brian Hines, Restore fairness of property rights,
STATESMAN JOURNAL, Nov. 4, 2007. 
162  Jim Johnson, Presentation, Willamette Valley Measure 37 Claims, Oregon Department of 
Agriculture, at http://www.oregon.gov/ODA/NRD/docs/ pdf/m37/ 
m37_ppt.pdf. 
163  Richmond & Houchen, MEASURE 37 at 11-13. 
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Many of the most controversial claims involved non-residential development, including 
billboards,164  casinos,165  tourist centers and recreational vehicle parks,166  strip-malls and shopping 
centers,167  industrial parks,168  hotels,169  golf courses,170  marinas,171  mines,172  and power plants.173  
Measure 37 claims seeking compensation or waivers for billboards (including one proposal to erect 
54 billboards in Portland alone174 ) were especially controversial given Oregon’s longstanding ban 
on billboards.175  Another notorious Measure 37 claimant proposed to construct a one million 
square-foot mega-mall in the middle of protected farm land.176  
Many of the largest Measure 37 claims, both in terms of acres involved and the amount of 
compensation demanded, were filed by timber companies.  For example, Plum Creek filed a claim 
seeking waivers of regulations that would have allowed it to pursue residential development of 
32,000 acres located along the Pacific Coast in Lincoln and Coos counties, or, in the alternative, 
demanding $94.8 million in compensation.177  Stimson Lumber Company filed claims seeking 
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Sept. 3, 2006. 
169  See, e.g., Jeff Wright, Claims spur watershed warning, REGISTER GUARD, Feb. 8, 2007. 
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TIMES, July 25, 2006. 
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177  Sightline Institute, TWO YEARS OF MEASURE 37 at 16; Alan Pittman, Looming Sprawl, EUGENE 
WEEKLY, Jan. 25, 2007; Eric Mortenson, Timber firm pulls land-use claims, OREGONIAN, Aug. 10, 
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compensation of approximately $269 million on over 47,384 acres of land178  and SDS Lumber 
Company filed claims seeking over $120 million on 1,465 acres of forestland in Hood River.179  
Implementation of Measure 37. On its face, Measure 37 raised numerous questions about 
how it should be interpreted and applied.  Some of the most important questions included who was 
eligible to file claims for compensation, how compensation was supposed to be calculated, what 
governmental entity was responsible for paying compensation, what governmental entity had 
authority to waive a regulatory restriction, whether land owners could transfer their rights under 
Measure 37 to purchasers of their land, whether land owners with valid Measure rights still had to 
comply with building codes and other health and safety regulations, and the scope of the various 
exemptions to the pay or waive mandate.180  Several of these issues were the subject of ongoing 
litigation when Measure 49 was adopted.181  
All told, Measure 37 claimants filed at least 300 lawsuits against the state and local 
governments.182  Neighbors also filed lawsuits challenging the issuance of waivers by the state or 
local governments.183  In several instances cities sued counties over their approval of Measure 37 
claims.184  The volume of controversy was even greater at the administrative level; neighboring land 
owners wrote over 85,000 letters to the state registering objections or other comments on over two 
thirds of the claims filed with the state.185  
A handful of local governments, including Eugene, Portland, and Wilsonville, responded to 
Measure 37 by passing ordinances authorizing neighbors whose land was affected by a claim 
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approved under Measure 37 to sue the owner of the subject property.186  While apparently no 
successful suits were filed under these ordinances, they provide a taste of the conflict engendered 
by Measure 37.  Not surprisingly, some critics began to call Measure 37 the “Hate Your Neighbor 
Act.”187  
Notwithstanding the numerous questions and controversies raised by Measure 37, it was 
apparent from the first that Measure 37 created a powerful new legal tool for land owners who 
objected to regulatory restrictions.  So long as it was clear that the offending regulation was adopted 
after the claimant or an ancestor purchased the property, the owner generally was entitled either to 
some level of compensation or to waiver of the regulation.  In a handful of instances, state and local 
governments refused to waive restrictions on the development of steep slopes and floodplain 
regulations, invoking the exemption for regulations designed to protect “public health and 
safety.”188  In addition, a Circuit Court judge ruled that land use regulations in the Columbia River 
Gorge National Scenic Area were protected from Measure 37 claims by the exemption for 
regulations “necessary to comply with federal law.” 189  Apart from these exceptional cases, 
however, filing a successful Measure 37 claim was generally equivalent to the proverbial shooting 
of fish in a barrel. 
Endless Waivers. Measure 37 appeared, on the surface, to offer the possibility of keeping 
existing regulations in place while paying compensation to those affected by the regulations.  
Indeed, immediately after the adoption of Measure 37, Governor Ted Kulongoski publicly insisted 
that regulations would not be waived and that some mechanism would be found to pay the 
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Louisiana and Mississippi 
 
In 1995, at the height of the property rights movement in the United States, Louisiana and 
Mississippi adopted takings measures narrowly designed to provide a compensation remedy for owners 
of agricultural and forest lands subject to regulatory restrictions.  Neither piece of legislation appears to 
have had any impact. 
 
The Louisiana property rights legislation grants owners of agricultural or forest lands a right of 
action against state agencies or local governments based on government actions “that cause[] a 
diminution in value of a parcel of private agricultural [or forest] property.”a The Act defines a 
“diminution in value” as “an existent reduction of twenty percent or more of the fair market value or the 
economically viable use of, as determined by a qualified appraisal expert, the affected portion of any 
parcel of private agricultural property or the property rights thereto for agricultural purposes, as a 
consequence of any regulation, rule, policy, or guideline promulgated for or by any governmental 
entity.”b When regulations diminish the value of agricultural or forest lands according to the definition 
set forth in the Act, the owner is entitled to compensation.c The government may “rescind or repeal” the 
rule, but the government would remain liable for “damages sustained by the property owner to his 
affected property which were caused by the application of the rescinded or repealed rule or regulation,” 
including attorneys fees and costs.d The legislation includes several broad exemptions, including for state 
statutory requirements and actions taken to comply with federal laws or regulations.e Like the Texas 
property rights legislation, the Louisiana legislation requires the government to “prepare a written 
assessment of any proposed governmental action prior to taking any proposed action that will likely result 
in a diminution in value of . . . property.”f However, the legislation creates no right of action making this 
requirement enforceable in court.  No lawsuits seeking compensation for the diminution in value of 
property have apparently been filed under the Act, perhaps because there has been no push in Louisiana 
for state or local legislation that would significantly restrict the uses of agricultural lands. 
 
The Mississippi Agricultural and Forestry Act also creates a takings remedy narrowly focused on 
restrictions on the use of land for forestry or agricultural activities.  The Act provides a right of action for 
a government measure that “prohibits or severely limits the right of an owner to conduct forestry or 
agricultural activities.”g The Act in turn defines “prohibits or severely limits” to mean “to reduce the 
value the fair market value of forest or agricultural land (or any part or parcel thereof) . . . by more than 
forty percent (40%) of their value before the action.” h The government is authorized to “repeal” or 
rescind the offending regulation, and if it does so before a final judicial decision, the claimant is entitled to 
“to recover its damages arising out of the action before the repeal,” as well as its attorneys fees and 
certain costs, at the discretion of the court.i On the other hand, an attempted repeal after a final judicial 
decision “shall not entitle the state to refuse payment, obtain a return of payment (if made) or result in 
ownership in the property by the state (absent a taking of one hundred percent (100%) of the property).” j
The Act includes a relatively lengthy list of exemptions, including for regulations designed to “prohibit 
activities that are noxious in fact or are harmful to the public health and safety,” fish and game laws, and 
orders that are “issued as a result of a violation of state law.k Again, there are no reports of actual 
litigation under this legislation, in part because of its very narrow scope, and probably in part for the same 
reasons there has been no litigation involving the Louisiana legislation. 
 
b LA. REV. ST. § 3:3610; LA. REV. ST. § 3:3602(11); LA. REV. ST. § 3:3623(C). 
c LA. REV. ST. § 3:3602(11). 
d LA. REV. ST. §§ 3:3610(D), (F); LA. REV. ST. §§ 3:3623(C)-(E); LA. REV. ST. § 3:3602(11). 
e LA. REV. ST. § 3:3610(F); LA. REV. ST. §§ 3:3623(D)-(E). 
f LA. REV. ST. § 3:3602(12); LA. REV. ST. § 3:3622(3). 
g LA. REV. ST. § 3:3609; LA. REV. ST. § 3622.1. 
h MISS. CODE § 49-33-7(e); MISS. CODE § 49-33-9(1). 
i MISS. CODE § 49-33-7(h). 
i MISS. CODE §§ 49-33-9(2)-(3). 
j MISS. CODE § 49-33-9(2). 
k MISS. CODE § 49-33-7(e). 
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claims.190  In practice, however, in all but one of the cases in which land owners filed valid Measure 
37 claims, the government responded by waiving the regulations.  There is apparently no 
authoritative record of the exact number of Measure 37 waivers issued, but they were undoubtedly 
in the thousands.191  
What accounts for this remarkably uniform response to Measure 37, which apparently no 
one in the debate over Measure 37 predicted?  The basic explanation is that the state and local 
governments lacked the funds to pay the claims.192  Measure 37 provided no dedicated funding to 
pay claims.  Moreover, valid Measure 37 claims, like constitutional regulatory takings judgments, 
were generally understood to be uninsured and uninsurable.  As a result, government officials 
would have been forced to spend extremely limited general funds from agency or local government 
budgets, or seek special legislative appropriations, to cover claims.  For financially strapped Oregon 
governments, waivers were not merely the path of least resistance, but a practical necessity. 
The daunting fiscal challenge of paying Measure 37 claims was compounded by the large 
volume of claims.  Even assuming it were possible for a local government to pay one or a few 
claims, it could not pay the dozens of similar claims that could potentially be filed.  From the local 
government perspective, a decision to pay a single claim likely would have generated many more 
claims for compensation. In addition, paying in one or a few cases would have raised the daunting 
policy and political challenge of deciding who deserved payment and who deserved a waiver.  A 
uniform policy of waivers avoided opening this Pandora’s Box. 
Finally, the waiver option was appealing to local governments because it avoided the 
technical complexities of attempting to calculate appropriate compensation.  There was substantial 
debate about whether a compensation award should be calculated using the traditional method in 
constitutional takings cases, based on the value of the land “with” and “without” the regulation, or 
using some other method.193  In addition, Measure 37 did not require a claimant to provide an 
appraisal with the claim, placing the burden of preparing the appraisal on the government.  
Furthermore, government officials had only 180 days to conduct their analysis and decide whether 
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to pay compensation or waive the regulation.194  Because of all these factors, state and local 
governments had ample encouragement to avoid paying and simply issue a waiver instead.   
 The lone case in which a local government paid compensation rather than waive the 
regulation helps to illustrate why compensation was so rare.  In October 2006, the Commissioners 
of Prineville, Oregon, voted to pay Grover and Edith Palin $48,000 in response to their Measure 37 
claim demanding either compensation or a waiver permitting them to build a home on two acres of 
their property.  Jerry Gillham, the assistant city manager, said of the offer “We don’t want to see 
rooflines on our rim rock.” 195  The Palins had purchased 15.7 acres on the edge of the rim rock 
overlooking the City and the Crooked River Valley in 1963.196  While the City’s offer essentially 
matched the Palins’ compensation demand, they rejected the offer and filed a new Measure 37 
claim encompassing their entire ownership and seeking $1.5 million in compensation or permission 
to build a diner and a hotel or condominiums on the property.197  Mr. Palin was quoted as stating, 
“Edith and I wanted a retirement home; we didn’t get it, so now if we don’t get that we might as 
well see how much money we can get. . . . I’m looking at pretty close to $5 million.” 198  The 
Palins’ strategy of upping the ante was partly successful, because the City ultimately paid the Palins 
$180,000 to prevent the proposed development.199  City council members who approved the 
payment believed they were “bowing to public sentiment when they declined permission for the 
Palins to build their home.”200  
Several unusual factors made the City willing to pay to resolve this claim.  The proposed 
development on the rim rock edge seriously threatened the scenic beauty of the community and 
generated vocal public opposition.  In addition, most of the land on the rim rock was already 
publicly owned, meaning that paying the Palins did not expose the City to the risk of numerous 
similar claims.  The one-of-a-kind nature of this claim distinguished it from the thousands of other 
Measure 37 claims. 
 
194  Local governments received a limited respite when the state enacted H.B. 3546, which extended 
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Granting a Measure 37 waiver was not the equivalent of issuing a building permit, and 
various obstacles still confronted owners who sought to proceed with development on the basis of a 
waiver.  A Measure 37 waiver only applied to the specific regulation that was the subject of the 
claim.  In some cases other, pre-existing regulations restricted or at least placed conditions on 
development of the property.201  Rules and regulations concerning water supply and sanitation, 
regardless of when they were adopted, were generally viewed as exempt from Measure 37 based on 
the “health and safety” exemption.202  In addition, some development projects required access to 
infrastructure, and Measure 37 imposed no affirmative obligation on governments to make public 
facilities and services available to claimants.203  For all of these reasons, apparently only a few 
hundred claims, at most, were converted into actual developments or vested development rights by 
the time Measure 37 was superseded by Measure 49.  There is no central database of vested claims, 
however, and therefore the full extent of the development authorized under Measure 37 will only 
become clear as individual owners seek to establish legal entitlements to develop their properties.204  
While the primary consequence of Measure 37 was a roll back of pre-existing regulatory 
standards, Measure 37 also had a chilling effect on any significant new regulatory initiatives.205  In 
general, the chilling effect was less pronounced, or at least less visible, than in Florida, probably 
because Oregon had a more fully developed land use regulatory regime.  Nonetheless, it is apparent 
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that Measure 37 played a role in derailing plans to enact more stringent regulations addressing 
stream corridor preservation206  and historic district protection.207  
Public Disenchantment with Measure 37. Virtually from the day Measure 37 was adopted 
public support for the measure began to erode.  Many voters apparently believed that Measure 37 
would operate “as a common-sense tool that Ma and Pa could use to cut through red tape” and 
“allow property owners to build homes for their children and grandchildren on their rural land.”208  
As hundreds and then thousands of claims were filled, involving major subdivisions in rural areas 
as well as mines, billboards, and large commercial developments, public sentiment about the 
measure began to change.  In March 2007, Governor Kulongoski said, “As every day goes by, 
more and more people are saying, ‘This isn’t what we thought we were voting for.’ ” 209  
Part of this shift in public attitudes about Measure 37 is attributable to the intensive media 
focus on the controversies generated by the measure.  Whereas only about 200 newspaper articles 
published before the election even mentioned the measure and less than 80 discussed it in any 
detail, almost 3000 newspaper articles about Measure 37 were published between 2004 and 2008.  
While the Oregonian gave limited attention to Measure 37 in the run up to the 2004 election, the 
newspaper assigned a reporter to cover the implementation of the measure on a full-time basis.210  
Another explanation for the change in public attitude is that Oregonians had never swayed 
in their support for the land use program.  As discussed, in spite of voting for Measure 37, the 
voters had previously rejected several ballot proposals that would have rolled back the land use 
program.  Moreover, opinion polls taken around the time of the passage of Measure 37 indicated 
that Oregonians still supported the land use system.211  While the voters’ approval of Measure 37 
apparently signaled a desire to address fairness issues, public attitudes about the measure shifted as 
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voters came to see support for Measure 37 as inconsistent with their support for the land use 
program.212  
An October 2006 poll taken by the national polling firm of Greenberg Quinlin Rosner 
Research revealed that voters, if given the opportunity to cast their votes again, would oppose 
Measure 37 by 2-to-1, with 48% voting no, and only 29% voting yes.213  The poll also reported that 
86% of voters had heard of Measure 37 and 56% of voters said they had heard a lot,214  indicating 
that voters were paying attention to Measure 37’s impacts.  While a plurality (48%) of all voters 
believed that Measure 37 was a mistake, a significant majority (62%) of voters who had heard a lot 
about Measure 37 reached the same conclusion.215  In other words, the more citizens knew about 
Measure 37, the more they disliked it.  
A poll taken in early 2007 by the firm of Fairbanks, Maslin, Mausllin & Associates showed 
that 69% of Oregon voters thought the measure should be either repealed or amended as soon as 
possible.216  While the poll revealed public sympathy for the desire of land owners to build one or a 
few homes on their land, it also revealed strong opposition to commercial development or 
subdivision of farm and forest lands.  Another poll around the same period sponsored by 1000 
Friends of Oregon showed 61% of Oregon voters in favor of either repealing or amending Measure 
37.217  
Measure 49
Political leaders in Oregon responded to this groundswell in favor of curbing Measure 37.  
In June 2007, at the urging of Governor Kulongoski, and after prolonged negotiations, the 
legislature passed House Bill 3540, a comprehensive set of amendments to Measure 37, and 
referred the legislation to the voters for their approval or disapproval.218  The legislation was 
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presented to voters as Measure 49 on November 6, 2007.  It passed by a margin of 61% to 39%, 
the same margin by which Measure 37 passed.219  
By November 2007, Oregonians had turned strongly against Measure 37.  One citizen who 
had previously voted for Measure 37, but changed his mind after his neighbor filed a claim under 
Measure 37 said: “We didn’t get hoodwinked this time. . . . We didn’t believe all the lies they were 
trying to spread—and the numbers show it. ”220  
Unlike Measure 37, which was relatively succinct and straightforward, Measure 49, which 
was the product of a protracted legislative debate, was a dense 22 pages of complex and confusing 
language.  It is a testament to Oregonians’ desire to be rid of Measure 37 that they voted in favor 
this virtually impenetrable alternative. 
Measure 49 essentially rescinded Measure 37’s pay-or-waive mandate as to existing laws 
and regulations and replaced it with a relatively modest, qualified roll back of pre-Measure 37 
restrictions on residential development in rural areas for those who previously filed valid Measure 
37 claims. As a result, most of the 1970’s-era restrictions on development of Oregon’s rural lands, 
especially high-value farm and forest lands, became effective again.  As to future regulations, 
Measure 49 left Measure 37 largely intact, but limited it to restrictions affecting residential 
development or farm or forest practices, and modified the formula for calculating compensation for 
regulatory restrictions.  The most unpredictable and potentially troublesome aspect of Measure 49 
is its application to future laws. 
In political terms, Measure 49 represented a compromise designed to satisfy two of the 
most powerful interest groups in the Measure 37 debate, 1000 Friends of Oregon and the timber 
industry.  The compromise served the interests of 1000 Friends of Oregon by restoring most (but 
not all) of the restrictions on development of Oregon’s agricultural and forest lands.  In exchange, 
the leading financial backers of Measure 37, timber companies, gained significant immunity from 
future regulation of forestry practices.  It was also a compromise uniquely adapted to Oregon, 
which already had a highly developed land use protection system and where land use advocates 
were relatively more interested in reestablishing the enforceability of existing regulations than 
retaining government’s long-term flexibility to adopt new regulations. 
Measure 49 has several important general provisions, including language prohibiting land 
owners from seeking compensation or waivers based on regulations restricting industrial or 
commercial uses (such as billboards, shopping malls, or gravel pits), thereby eliminating one of the 
 
219  Office of the Secretary of State, Elections Division, Official Results for 2007 November Special 
Election, available at http://www.sos.state.or us/elections/ nov62007/abstract/results.doc 
220  Peter Wong, Voters approve modifying land rules; Measure 37 revision wins handily among 
Mid-Valley voters, STATESMAN JOURNAL, Nov. 7, 2007. 
45
most controversial features of Measure 37.221  In addition, Measure 49 eliminated the prohibition 
on the transferability of waivers,222  established a new formula for determining whether regulations 
have reduced property values,223  and created a cause of action for neighboring land owners 
adversely affected by Measure 37 decisions.224  
With respect to land use restrictions in effect prior to January 1, 2007, in lieu of Measure 
37’s pay or waive mandate, Measure 49 allows owners who previously filed valid claims (or had 
already been granted waivers) to seek permission to construct either (1) up to three dwelling units 
on land outside of urban growth boundaries, or (2) up to ten units on (a) land inside urban growth 
boundaries or (b) land outside urban growth boundaries that is not high-value farmland or high-
value forestland and that is not in a ground water restricted area.225  To obtain permission to 
construct up to three dwellings, the owner is required to show that a current regulation prohibits the 
construction of units that were otherwise permitted at the time he acquired the property.  To take 
advantage of the second 10-unit option, the claimant also has to demonstrate, using the new formula 
in Measure 49, that the adoption of the regulation reduced the value of the property.226  
With respect to future laws and regulations, Measure 49 retains a modified version of 
Measure 37.  The state or local government is required to pay compensation or waive the restriction 
if a regulation adopted in the future restricts residential development or farm or forest practices and 
reduces private property values.227  In essence, Oregon has adopted a prospective takings measure 
with respect to residential development and agricultural or forestry practices that is comparable to 
those adopted in Arizona in 2004 or Florida in 1995. 
As discussed, Measure 49 changed the formula for determining whether a regulation 
reduces property value. In lieu of the traditional with-and-without approach used in constitutional 
takings cases, Measure 49 defines a reduction in fair market value as being “equal to the decrease, 
if any, in the fair market value of the property from the date that is one year before the enactment of 
the land use regulation to the date that is one year after enactment, plus interest.”228  This 
methodology applies both to claims based on new regulations and to prior Measure 37 claims 
where the owner seeks to use the conditional path to obtain permission to develop up to ten 
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dwellings. The new formula for calculating compensation is more defensible from an economics 
perspective and is less likely to confer substantial windfalls on land owners than the original 
Measure 37 formula.  However, the new formula is problematic insofar as it assumes that no 
individual regulation should ever reduce private property values, will likely prove very difficult to 
apply in practice, and may lend itself to exaggerated claims of financial loss.229  
What Comes Next?
Measure 49 decidedly represents a mixed bag.  The vote on Measure 49 reflects public 
rejection of the property rights agenda based on actual experience with the consequences of 
Measure 37.  The experience in Oregon already has and undoubtedly will continue to serve as a 
cautionary lesson for other states.  On the other hand, Measure 49, in its details, is a highly nuanced 
and complicated political compromise.  Measure 49 achieved the primary objective of Oregon land 
use advocates by reestablishing most of the McCall-era land use protections for Oregon’s extensive 
farm and forest lands.  At the same time, as to the future, Measure 49 leaves the core of Measure 37 
largely untouched.  As one prominent commentator has observed, “Measure 49 retained, at least to 
a large extent, the promise at the heart of Measure 37—entitling land owners to compensation for 
loss of value or a regulatory waiver when a government enacts a regulation restricting residential 
development, agriculture, or forestry practice—thereby curtailing governmental ability to manage 
future growth.”230  
It is difficult to predict how much of a chilling effect Measure 49 will have on future 
regulatory initiatives and how state and local governments will respond to claims under Measure 49.  
Oregonians, at least for the time being, have limited their ability to address future land use and 
environmental challenges.  Whether Oregon will learn to live with this uneasy compromise, or 
eventually reject the property rights agenda not only with respect to pre-existing regulations but also 
with respect to future law-making, only time will tell. 
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IV. The Lessons Learned 
For several reasons, the experiences in Florida and Oregon with takings legislation were 
different.  The takings measures are (or were) different, the underlying regulatory programs were 
different, and the historic volumes of growth and development in each state were different.  
Nonetheless, our review of the experiences in Florida and Oregon (informed as well by the 
experiences of other states that have adopted similar legislation) suggests five overarching 
conclusions. 
 The Takings Agenda Undermines Community Protections
The takings agenda in Florida and Oregon undermined the public’s ability to adopt and/or 
enforce regulations designed to protect homeowners, the environment, and the community as a 
whole.  What the takings agenda did not foster in either state was a deliberative process allowing 
officials to modify or repeal regulations that imposed too great a cost relative to their benefits and to 
retain valuable regulations and arrange payment of compensation to affected land owners.  The 
takings agenda, despite the substantial rhetoric about “compensation,” typically did not involve 
making payments to anyone.  Instead, it turned out to be almost exclusively about stopping 
regulation. 
Former Solicitor General Charles Fried famously characterized the property rights agenda:  
“The grand plan was to make government pay compensation as for a taking of property 
every time its regulations impinged too severely on a property right—limiting the possible 
uses for a parcel of land or restricting or tying up a business in regulatory red tape.  If the 
government labored under so severe an obligation, there would be, to say the least, much 
less regulation.”231  
Fried’s perceptive description of the ultimate goal of the takings agenda appears to have 
been borne out by the actual experiences in Florida and Oregon.  There is substantial anecdotal 
evidence from both states that the takings regime had a significant chilling effect on the enactment 
of new regulations and, in Oregon, resulted in a roll back of existing regulations.  The number of 
times that governments paid compensation to keep regulations in place can be counted on the 
fingers of one hand.  
The uniform deregulatory impact of takings measures does not conform to the expectations 
of either the proponents or opponents of these measures.  As noted, Florida Governor Chiles 
predicted that the Bert Harris Act would “safeguard[] our environmental and growth-management 
protections while also offering private property owners a means to seek compensation for devalued 
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land.”232  The Oregon League of Cities predicted that Measure 37 would produce compensation 
awards totaling $3.8 billion rather than massive deregulation.233  
Nor does it conform to the predictions of commentators who have argued that the takings 
agenda should bring more accountability and balance to the regulatory process.  For example, E. 
Donald Elliott wrote that property rights legislation, by “regulating the regulators,” creates 
“incentives for government to design rules more carefully and maximize the environmental benefits 
of regulatory investments. ” 234  In the words of another commentator,  
the presence of property rights legislation will require legislators and regulators to balance 
the costs against the benefits of legislation that would affect private property.  If a regulation 
is determined to be sufficiently important to pay for the impact it will have on land 
owners—or at least valuable and important enough to run the risk of having to pay for it—
then it is more likely to be an effective, worthwhile regulation.  If the cost of a regulation is 
not worth paying for, then perhaps the regulation should not be passed.235  
A basic assumption underlying this viewpoint has been that a payment requirement would not 
preclude regulation altogether.  Rather, “[a] damages remedy gives the government a choice.  It can 
continue the regulation if it values it above the market price.”236  
The reality in Florida and Oregon has been quite different, with state and local regulators 
waiving, repealing, or simply not adopting all manner of land use and environmental regulations.  
This effect is partly attributable to the magnitude of the claims, the lack of dedicated funding 
mechanisms, and the difficulty of determining the appropriate level of compensation.  It also may 
reflect the understandable concern, discussed below, that paying claims might confer windfalls on 
claimants who have suffered little if any reduction in the value of their properties. 
 But these on-the-ground results also suggest that the takings agenda is based on a 
fundamental misconception about the incentives driving official behavior at the state and local levels.  
As suggested by the statements quoted above, takings advocates generally treat the burdens of 
compensation awards and the benefits of regulatory programs as commensurate, that is, they 
assume that paying land owners has the same political significance for state and local decision-
makers as the community-wide benefits of regulation.  But, based on the experience in Florida and 
Oregon, state and local officials are apparently influenced far more by concerns about the impact of 
compensation awards on their budgets than they are by the effects of widespread waivers on the 
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general public welfare.237  The political costs of paying expensive compensation claims (and dealing 
with the resulting budgetary tradeoffs) is apparently far greater than dealing with public complaints 
about, say, extensive wetlands destruction, or massive traffic congestion, even if these environmental 
costs are more severe, because these costs tend to be relatively diffuse in space and time.  As a 
result, takings compensation measures do not produce careful calculations of the relative costs and 
benefits of regulatory programs.  Rather, these measures operate through the backdoor to dismantle 
and prevent regulation altogether. 
Special Interests Benefit the Most from the Takings Agenda
While the takings agenda has commonly been portrayed as being for and on behalf of the 
“little guy,”238  the primary beneficiaries of the takings agenda in Oregon and Florida have been 
well-heeled special interests.  
In Oregon, the timber industry, which provided the most generous financial support to the 
yes campaign, also filed the largest Measure 37 claims in terms of both acreage and the amount of 
compensation demanded.  Major timber industry contributors to the campaign included Seneca 
Jones Timber Co. ($321,000), Dr. Johnson Lumber Company ($75,000), Stimson Lumber 
Company ($30,000), Murphy Plywood ($25,000), Giustina Land & Timber Co. ($20,000), and 
SDS Lumber Company ($7,500).239  All told, contributors to the yes campaign filed claims under 
Measure 37 seeking payments totaling $600 million.240  
While the individual seeking to build a home for himself or his family was the face of the 
Measure 37 campaign, the majority of applications under Measure 37 to build residences involved 
multi-unit subdivisions.  In terms of acreage, subdivisions with ten or more units represented 70% 
of the acreage affected by proposed residential projects. 
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business agenda.  Mary Ellen Klas, Powerful Land Owners Fuel Property Revolt, PALM BEACH 
POST, Mar. 11, 1994. 
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Likewise in Florida, powerful monied interests were behind the push for property rights 
legislation.  U.S. Sugar Corporation, a large Florida agribusiness that owns approximately 190,000 
acres in Florida, provided major backing for the constitutional amendment petition that laid the 
groundwork for eventual adoption of the Bert Harris Act.241  Other corporations that owned 
millions of acres of undeveloped land contributed heavily to the Florida Legal Foundation, the 
organization that led the drive for property rights legislation, including St. Joe Paper Company, 
Lykes Brothers, and Collier Enterprises.242  
Substantial anecdotal evidence, discussed above, demonstrates that large developers have 
successfully exploited the Bert Harris Act to overcome regulatory obstacles and construct larger 
and more environmentally intrusive developments than would have been allowed in the absence of 
the legislation.  In general, owners of the largest tracts of undeveloped land have benefited the most. 
In both states, the takings agenda has actually undermined the rights and interests of most 
property owners.  Most property owners are homeowners, and they depend on community 
protections to control activities that could adversely affect the value of their investments. 
The Takings Agenda Creates Land Use Conflicts
Another notable lesson from the Florida and Oregon experiences is that property rights 
legislation generates controversy and conflict.  Measure 37 produced thousands of legal claims and 
hundreds of lawsuits, and the Florida property rights legislation produced substantial but smaller 
numbers of claims and lawsuits.  All of this legal activity produced neighbor-neighbor conflicts 
between those seeking to develop their property and those who believed they were protected from 
harmful development by regulation. 
One of the basic purposes of the Oregon land use program is to reduce land use conflicts 
by separating sometimes inconsistent land uses, such as intensive agricultural and residential uses.  
Measure 37 fundamentally undermined this policy by authorizing land owners to obtain waivers 
from the state’s comprehensive land use rules.  Farmers in areas traditionally devoted exclusively to 
agriculture found themselves threatened, as a result of Measure 37, with potentially incompatible 
residential subdivisions next door.  The conflicts were exacerbated by the fact that Measure 37 
authorized owners to obtain waivers based, not on logical planning principles, but on the 
happenstance of when they (or an ancestor) acquired the property.  As a result, Measure 37 waivers 
were spread across the landscape in scattershot fashion, maximizing the neighbor-neighbor 
conflicts. 
There are numerous examples of the conflicts generated by Measure 37.  Susie Kunzman 
and other farmers in Clackamas County objected to a neighbor’s plan to open a gravel mine by 
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invoking Measure 37.243  Although County Commissioners were sympathetic to the farmers, they 
lacked the funds to pay compensation and were forced to waive the regulations.244  Marion County 
Judge Paul Lipscomb, acting as a private citizen, sued the state and his neighbors over his 
neighbors’ plan to subdivide their property, claiming that it would reduce the value of his 
property.245  Farmers Bob and Crystal Vanderzanden filed a lawsuit against the state for approving 
their neighbor’s plan to subdivide a 54-acre property into half-acre lots and build up to 117 
homes.246  They argued the occupants of these new homes would “complain about the noise, 
chemical sprays, smells and pollution generated by the agricultural operations, as well as the early 
hours at which such operations commence, the late hours at which they terminate, and their 
continuation throughout summer weekends. ” 247  
A report prepared by the Oregon Department of Agriculture mapped the numerous 
subdivisions that could be developed under Measure 37 in protected farmland, and concluded: 
At least 132,346 acres of some of the best farm land in the Willamette Valley could 
be impacted by development claims made under the Measure 37 property rights 
initiative.  That impact may also cast a shadow on adjacent existing farms by 
creating compatibility issues between farmers and nearby residents.  There may also 
be impacts on water needed for irrigation.248  
Based on another estimate, development authorized by Measure 37 could have negatively affected 
90% of the farming operations in Washington County and half of the operations in Hood River 
County.249  
Measure 37 also generated conflict by producing “moral hazards,” that is, by encouraging 
property owners, lured by the prospect of a Measure 37 windfall, to advance more intensive 
development plans then they would have in the absence of the measure.  As one commentator put it, 
Measure 37 “brought out the worst in people.”250  One striking example is the case of the Palins of 
Prineville, who, in response to the community’s rejection of their application to build a home, 
formulated a new plan for a more grandiose development on the property.  They reasoned that the 
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larger their plans, the more money they could get.  In another example, a claimant sought payment 
of $203 million based on an extravagant proposal to construct “a geothermal power plant, an open-
pit mine containing an estimated 8.5 million cubic yards of high-quality pumice, and a hundred 
upscale vacation homes equipped with septic tanks and drainfields” on 157 acres alongside a lake 
in the Newberry National Volcanic Monument.251  
Similarly, the Florida property rights legislation generated numerous conflicts, ranging from 
the battle over Stranahan House in downtown Fort Lauderdale to the acrimonious contest over 
residential development on the outer urbanizing edge of Bartow.  More generally, the Florida 
property rights legislation has fostered a sense of public hopelessness about government’s capacity 
to control the pace and location of development, helping to spawn the Florida Hometown 
Democracy movement. 
Finally, some of the conflict generated by the takings measures is attributable to the legal 
confusion and uncertainty surrounding the measures.  According to some, one purpose of takings 
measures is to improve on the sometimes confusing and often-maligned constitutional takings 
doctrine; as stated by one commentator, the Bert Harris Act was intended “to bring clarity to the 
admittedly muddled body of case law regarding regulatory takings.” 252  In fact, while constitutional 
takings doctrine is a matter of continuing debate, the U.S. Supreme Court has succeeded in recent 
years in bringing relative stability and predictability to this area of law.253  Thus, the net effect of the 
Bert Harris Act has been to generate new questions and uncertainties that will require decades to 
resolve.  As discussed above, the Bert Harris Act, by changing the takings standard, but 
incorporating familiar terms from constitutional takings doctrine, has created an especially 
confusing new set of legal rules.  Oregon’s Measure 37, too, generated many new legal issues, 
though arguably fewer than the Florida property rights legislation. 
The Takings Agenda Confers Special Windfalls on Owners
The popularity of the takings agenda has rested on its appeal to fairness, the idea that the 
public has a duty to pay compensation (or not enforce a regulation) when a restriction reduces the 
value of private property.  The experience gained from Florida and Oregon reveals the serious flaws 
in this superficially appealing argument.   
First, while certain regulations sometimes burden property owners and reduce property 
values, comprehensive land use programs, such as those in Oregon and Florida, tend to support and 
enhance property values.  Thus, to the extent the takings agenda assumes that regulatory restrictions 
generally reduce property values, the entire premise of the takings project is problematic.  Second, 
recognizing that regulations sometimes impose some burden on property owners, paying “just 
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Ironically, perhaps the most telling illustration of the potentially positive effect of 
land use regulations, and the potential unfairness of the takings agenda, is provided by the 
experience of Dorothy English, the most prominent and publicly sympathetic advocate of 
Measure 37.   
 
The real story about her property, according to news articles and available public 
records, is that Mr. and Mrs. English bought a 39-acre property in 1953 for $4,500.a There 
were no zoning restrictions on the property at the time of the purchase, and when 
Multnomah County adopted a zoning ordinance five years later it allowed as many as 42 
lots on her property.b The Englishes sold off about 11 acres of the property in 1974 for 
$26,400, and then in 1977 sold off another 9 acres for $27,000.  In the 1970’s, a new 20-
acre minimum lot size requirement was imposed under the Oregon land use program 
effectively requiring them to keep the remaining 19 acres intact.c Land use planners 
contended that “[s]mall-scale development on land like English’s would strain country 
roads and other services,” and that the “property was zoned forestland because its soil is 
suited to commercial forestry, not suburban construction.”d County records indicated that 
as of 2007, the remaining 19 acres owned by Mrs. English had a market value of $462,370, 
though Mrs. English claimed that they were worth $600,000.e “In investment terms 
(disregarding the earlier profits from selling off half the property), these figures translate 
into a rate of return on the original investment of 9.5% and 10.1% per year.”f
In spite of this impressive return on the family’s original investment, Mrs. English 
sought permission to subdivide the remaining property into eight parcels.g Her Measure 37 
claim stated that the property’s value would be $1.75 million if it could be developed in 
accordance with this plan.  The $1.75 million figure represents a rate of return of 12.4%.h
The County decided to issue a waiver permitting her proposed development to proceed.  
Nonetheless, claiming that the County was insisting on enforcing certain other restrictions 
against the property, Mrs. English sued and an Oregon county court awarded Mrs. English 
$1.15 million for the value of her land, plus $438,000 in attorney fees.i This litigation has 
presumably been rendered moot by the enactment of Measure 49.j
a Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute, PROPERTY VALUES AND OREGON 
MEASURE 37; EXPOSING THE FALSE PREMISE OF LAND REGULATION’S HARM TO LAND 
OWNERS 17 (2007). 
b Laura Oppenheimer, Breaking Ground Land Owners Who Fought For Measure 37 
Ready the First Cases, OREGONIAN, Nov. 22, 2004. 
c Id. 
d Id. 
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compensation” according to the formula in the takings measures effectively grants windfalls that 
are disproportionate to any injury suffered by the claimants.  A compensation award under a 
takings measure reflects the value of a special exemption from the rules that continue to apply to 
everybody else, not the amount that would offset any actual regulatory burden suffered by the 
claimant as a result of the regulation. 
The evidence from Oregon demonstrates that the case for Measure 37 was based on wildly 
inflated estimates of the adverse effect of land use restrictions on private property values.  During 
the debate preceding the 2004 vote on Measure 37, Oregonians in Action asserted that “our 
planning system lowers the value of private property in Oregon by $5.4 billion a year.” 254  But this 
figure is demonstrably incorrect.  Following the adoption of Measure 37, the Georgetown 
Environmental Law & Policy Institute, working in collaboration with agricultural economists from 
Oregon State University and the University of Minnesota, conducted an intensive empirical 
investigation to determine the actual impact of the Oregon land use program on property values.255  
This study found no evidence that the Oregon land use program had a systematically adverse effect 
on private property values.256  These findings are consistent with many similar empirical studies 
conducted elsewhere in the United States documenting that even stringent land use restrictions 
commonly have little if any adverse effect on private property values.257  
These empirical findings are consistent with economists’ theoretical understandings of how 
land use regulations ordinarily affect private property values. 258  On the one hand, land use 
regulations may have a tendency to reduce property value by restricting permitted land uses and 
reducing the economic returns available from the land.  On the other hand, regulations positively 
affect property values by protecting amenity values in the community and minimizing conflicts with 
nearby and adjacent land uses.  Regulations also positively affect land values by creating a scarcity 
of development opportunities, thereby increasing the value of the development opportunities that 
remain.  For example, zoning requirements may reduce the number of buildable lots in the 
community, but each building lot is likely to be more valuable than it would be in the absence of the 
program.  As a matter of economic theory, it is indeterminate whether the net effect of these 
 
254  David Hunnicutt, Measure 37 Brings Balance to Oregon’s Land Use System, LOOKING 
FORWARD (Oregonians in Action Education Center Sept.-Oct. 2004), available at oia.org/ec.html. 
255  Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute, PROPERTY VALUES AND OREGON MEASURE 
37: EXPOSING THE FALSE PREMISE OF REGULATION’S HARM TO LAND OWNERS at 1-3, 23-29 (2007). 
256  Specifically, a comparison of trends in agricultural land values over time in Oregon and in 
neighboring states with far fewer development restrictions revealed that Oregon land values 
increased at about the same rate and sometimes faster than in the other states.  Another comparison 
of trends in land values in Oregon inside and outside urban growth boundaries revealed no 
systematic reduction in the rate of appreciation of heavily restricted lands outside urban growth 
boundaries.  Id. 
257  Id. 
258  Id. (describing numerous other empirical studies of the effects of land use regulations on 
private property values). 
55
different forces will be positive or negative.  A recent assessment of the economics of agricultural 
zoning observed, “Economic theory does not give us a clear answer whether down zoning should 
decrease or increase property values. ” 259  
The second major economics problem with the takings agenda is that, even assuming 
regulations sometimes impose some burden on property owners, the compensation formulas 
generate monetary awards that amount to unfair windfalls. 260  The formulas call for a comparison 
of the market value of an individual parcel subject to the offending regulation with the market value 
of the property as if the regulation were lifted from that parcel alone.261  This with and without 
approach is inherently problematic because it ignores the fact that the value of the property is 
influenced not only by the restrictions limiting use of the property but also by application of the 
same restrictions to neighboring properties.  The formula in the takings measures effectively allows 
a claimant to continue to reap the benefits of regulation of neighboring properties while demanding 
relief based on the regulatory restrictions that apply to him.  This calculation does not capture the 
amount required to actually compensate an owner for any loss due to regulation, but instead reflects 
the amount an owner would be paid if he and he alone were entitled to a special exemption from the 
rules that apply to the rest of the community.   
In economic theory, the correct way to measure the effect of a regulation is to ask what the 
value of the property would be if the regulation had not been adopted and did not apply to anyone 
in the community.  While economists can perform these types of analyses using econometric 
models, this complex method cannot generally be applied in individual regulatory takings cases and 
it certainly has never been applied in cases arising under the Bert Harris Act or Measure 37.262  
Although it is inherently misleading, the with-and-without method is straight-forward and it 
is the method courts generally use in constitutional takings cases.  The important difference in 
constitutional takings cases is that liability is only triggered if the calculation reveals a very 
substantial (generally 90% or more) reduction in property value.  This high threshold effectively 
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incorporates into the analysis the fact that regulations have both positive and negative effects on 
value.  Absent a very severe apparent loss in value using this approach, courts cannot conclude that 
a claimant has demonstrated any serious economic loss that might justify compensation as a matter 
of fairness.  By contrast, under the takings measures, any adverse impact is sufficient to trigger the 
need for compensation, yielding routine demands for windfall payments.   
Of course, as discussed, under both the Oregon and Florida measures, claims have generally 
resulted in rollbacks of the challenged regulation rather than payment of compensation.  But the 
economic analysis remains the same.  If claimants succeed in using these measures to obtain an 
exemption from rules that apply to everyone else in the community, and are permitted to develop 
property in a different and more intensive way than their neighbors, they obtain an economic 
windfall because the development is more valuable than it would otherwise be.  Either way, 
claimants receive not merely redress for any injuries they may have suffered, but a special boon at 
public expense. 
The Takings Agenda Undermines Local Democracy
The final lesson from Florida and Oregon is that takings measures have undermined 
opportunities for the public to participate in and influence land use decision making.  As discussed, 
both Oregon’s and Florida’s land use programs make public participation an integral part of the 
land use decision making process. The takings measures undermined the public participation goals 
of both states. 
While Measure 37 contained no provision mandating public involvement in the Measure 37 
claims process, the measure stated that governments “may adopt or apply procedures for the 
processing of claims under this act,” including procedures related to public involvement.  Both the 
state and many local governments adopted procedures to handle Measure 37 claims.263  
Notwithstanding this formal opportunity to participate, the public’s ability to influence the 
outcome was limited by a lack of substantive rights in these proceedings.264  The negative impact of 
development on neighbors or the surrounding community was irrelevant under Measure 37, unless 
the objection could be shoehorned into the measure’s relatively narrow exemptions for regulations 
addressing “public nuisances under common law” (which the measure expressly said “shall be 
construed narrowly in favor of a finding of compensation under this Act”), or “restricting or 
prohibiting activities for the protection of public health and safety.”  Apart from these grounds, the 
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public was left to object about when a regulation was adopted or when the claimant acquired the 
property or, in a handful cases, whether a restriction on a particular proposed use of property 
actually reduced the value of the property.265  
In Florida, the Bert Harris Act’s only reference to the public is the provision stating that the 
government must give written notice of the claim to contiguous owners and to parties to the 
underlying administrative proceeding.  However, the Act grants the public no official standing to 
participate in settlement discussions under the Act, and the discussions are generally understood to 
be exempt from Florida’s Government in the Sunshine Law.266  As a result, settlement discussions 
under the Bert Harris Act are referred to as “shade meetings. ” 267  While the government entering 
into a settlement is supposed to conclude that “the relief granted shall protect the public interest 
served by the regulation at issue,” the public has no formal opportunity to submit comments on 
whether this standard will be met.  Similarly, the Act grants the public no formal opportunity to 
participate in court proceedings to approve settlements that would contravene a statute.   
In any event, in Florida the public has even fewer substantive grounds on which to object 
than in Oregon.  Assuming a claimant can establish a prima facie entitlement to compensation, the 
public’s only significant defense is if the regulatory burdens flow from “governmental abatement, 
prohibition, prevention, or remediation of a public nuisance at common law or a noxious use of 
private property.”268  The entire thrust of the settlement process, subject to the general caveat that 
the “public interest” be served, is to seek some opportunity to ratchet down the regulatory 
requirements, whether through “[i]ncreases . . . in the density. . . [or] intensity” of land uses, 
“issuance of . . . a variance, special exception, or other extraordinary relief,” and so on.269  
The Dispute Resolution Act provides somewhat greater opportunities for public involvement 
in that Act’s mediation process.  But again the entire thrust of the Act is to circumscribe the 
public’s role and limit its ability to raise broader community concerns.  The public has no clear 
entitlement to participate in the mediation process.  Even if they are allowed to participate in 
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hearings, informal negotiations may occur outside the confines of the formal hearing and the public 
has no entry point into those discussions.270  The Act makes clear that the public has no standing to 
seek improvements in the underlying regulatory decision that would better protect the public 
interest.  Instead, members of the public can only raise objections to proposed rollbacks of 
regulatory standards “which may impact their substantial interests. ” 271  Thus, the entire purpose of 
the process is to address the concerns of the developer, not to consider the concerns of neighbors or 
of the community.  From a public advocacy perspective, the Dispute Resolution Act is a loser’s 
game, and the only real question is how much the public will lose. 
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